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HEEDING PHIL FRICKEY’S CALL: THE ISSUES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous 
Law & Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law 
Miigwetch, Mary Louise for the kind introduction and kind words.  I am 
going to spend a couple of minutes talking about why we are here and 
introducing this whole thing.  We are going to talk about Phil Frickey’s 
call, so I guess we have to thank him also for being here.  This really started 
five or six years ago. Frickey spoke about something he called new realism 
back in 2006 at the Cohen Symposium.1 Then, in 2007, he brought a bunch 
of us — including some that are here and others — to talk about what that 
might mean for legal scholars.2 He spoke a little bit more about it in 2008 in 
his Kansas address right near the end of his life.3  
I would say looking back at those materials and thinking about what I 
recalled about what was going on, I think there were four things that Phil 
was calling for. The first is more empirical research, social science research 
that has good methodology and actual analysis based on actual data from 
Indian Country.  He was also saying, “Let’s have more research that is 
grounded in tribal realities in Indian Country, more theoretical and practical 
research.” He also added that Indian scholars need to have more scholarly 
objectivity. Finally, he said there should be fewer doctrinal papers. I think 
what Phil said was, “We do not need to write the twenty-seventh article 
about Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe4 all the time; it’s already been 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New 
Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2006) [hereinafter Frickey, 
Transcending] (essay based on an address given at the symposium “Indian Law at a 
Crossroads,” University of Connecticut School of Law, Oct. 28, 2005). 
 2. See Conference Transcript: The New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship 
in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Conference 
Transcript] (transcript of a meeting of the National Congress of American Indians, Berkeley, 
Cal., Nov. 17, 2006). 
 3. See Philip P. Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law 
and Institutions, February 2, 2008: Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 24 (2008) [hereinafter Frickey, Address]. 
 4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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done.”  To be fair, what’s missing from Indian law is the Indians.5 Frank 
Pommersheim in his book Braid of Feathers from the mid-1990s said there 
is just not enough tribally centered scholarship out there.6  Of course, we all 
know Sam Deloria says this all the time.7 I bring Sam up because he, of 
everyone, is really interested in the scholarly activity of this new realism, 
this research, and he would say we need less cheerleading.  This is our five-
year retrospective.  
I wanted to highlight something that I wrote about in a short paper — it 
is an honor to talk about it at this conference — on the citation patterns of 
federal, state, and tribal courts to Indian law scholarship going back to 
1959.8 But I want to talk a little bit, before we move on to this panel, about 
my own experiences, about what brought us out here in 2007, and I took 
very seriously what he was saying. I can tell you realism is not easy. I have 
had so many starts and stops and foibles since then that it’s not funny.  One 
of the things I remember John Dossett talking about specifically back in 
2007 was, “When will we know what the rules are for fee to trust 
acquisitions? We do not know what kind of lands go into trust.”9 We don’t 
know case-by-case what’s going to happen, and a good study would be a 
survey of how that actually works. I take that prescription seriously.  
I come from the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
in Michigan. We were federally recognized in 1980 with twelve acres, and 
we have been trying to get land back ever since.10  So the trust acquisition 
process is central to our core as a modern government, and I know about it 
myself, but I tell you, unless I had a couple million bucks to research this 
thing, it’s not going to happen. If you want information regarding so-and-
so, the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) would be happy to give it to 
you eventually, but for a cost.  
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the 
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1989). 
 6. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995). 
 7. E.g., Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations, 
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55 (2002) (based on remarks during a panel discussion at the “Symposium 
on Cultural Sovereignty: Native Rights in the 21st Century,” March 7, 2001). 
 8. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Legal Scholarship and the Courts: 
Heeding Frickey’s Call, CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT (Mar. 21, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
californialawreview.org/articles/american-indian-legal-scholarship-and-the-courts-heeding-
frickey-s-call. 
 9. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006). 
 10. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS (2012). 
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 For example, I had my law library request some documents from the 
Interior under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), only twenty-five 
cents a page, which is probably something we could have negotiated, but 
there were 12,000 pages. I just couldn’t do it; I had to get tenure first. There 
are other things too, in regards to getting research done. I remember Pat 
Sekaquaptewa saying this as well at the conference in 2007.11 It’s not easy 
to go to Indian Country and say, “Hey, give us this information,” right? She 
was saying that it’s hard for tribal leaders, tribal attorneys, Indian people, or 
scholars to come on the reservation and demand all this information, no 
matter how nicely they do it.We still remember the anthropologist problem 
that Vine Deloria talked about in the 1960s.12  
So there is also a demand on time. For example, another research project 
I started had to do with how many nonmembers in Indian Country have 
consented to tribal jurisdiction.  I just wanted to do a sampling of a couple 
of different tribes just to get a sense. I know from some other tribes I 
worked for in the West that there were a lot of people who worked for the 
tribe, such as non-Indians who were employees for the tribe, had vendor 
contracts with the tribe, and who lived in tribal housing with tribal members 
who may have been their family members. It would have been nice to get a 
guestimate; but it’s almost impossible to get that information.   
The Navajo Tribe is great — they will send you to every single agency 
that doesn’t have that information.  There are a lot of those agencies. But I 
was able to write a few papers about that even before Phil passed away. I 
was able to get a copy of some of the materials Justice Blackmun had made 
available online13 (thanks to John Dossett and Ian Gershengorn who told me 
about this) from the mid-1980s to late 1990s about what the Supreme Court 
justices are thinking, and what they write (during the certiorari process).14  I 
started shortly after the conference; I wasn’t thinking about the conference 
anymore.  It ends up being related in some way, the core of the research I 
did, ironically. So this conference is in honor of all that.   
I am not going to introduce the panelists one by one. We don’t have a 
whole lot of time. They have ten to twelve minutes to talk. I’m here with a 
stick to make sure we don’t go over our time. Thank you. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See generally Conference Transcript, supra note 2, at 120-26. 
 12. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN 
MANIFESTO 78-100 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1988) (1969). 
 13. Digital Archive of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, UNIV. OF S. CAL – LEE EPSTEIN, 
http://epstein.usc.edu/blackmun.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). 
 14. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as 
Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009). 
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Joseph Heath, Attorney at Law, Onondaga Nation General Counsel15 
Good afternoon everyone.  I want to thank the law school for having this 
forum and all of you for coming. 
My name is Joe Heath.  I am fortunate enough to be General Counsel for 
the Onondaga Nation.  Onondaga is the central fire of the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy.   They are often known as the Iroquois, which is a pejorative 
French colonial term.  Their name for themselves is Haudenosaunee, which 
roughly translates as “People of the Longhouse.” 
Onondaga is a traditional nation.16  They still govern themselves by the 
Great Law of Peace that was brought to them over a thousand years ago by 
the Peacemaker.  They are governed by a Council of Chiefs, selected by 
Clan Mothers, who also have the removal authority.17  They have 
maintained their active clan system, and they still perform their ceremonies 
and speak their language.18  The Tadodaho was hopeful to be here today, 
but they are in the middle of a ceremonial period that runs for about five 
weeks, and he just could not get away from that.   
The Onondaga Nation does not accept any federal funding.19 Most of the 
work my office does — there are only two lawyers and a community 
organizer — is diplomatic and environmental because the nation is trying to 
fulfill its obligation to be good stewards of the land and water that is left in 
central New York. I will get back to some of our environmental work in a 
minute.   
                                                                                                                 
15. General Counsel to the Onondaga Nation, the central fire keeper of the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy.  Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University 
Law School, 1982; Adjunct Professor, SUNY Oswego, 1982-1983; A.B., Syracuse 
University, 1968; J.D., SUNY Buffalo, 1974; and admitted to the New York State Bar in 
1975. 
This Essay was originally presented as a speech on September 27, 2012 at the UC 
Berkeley Law School at the “Heeding Frickey’s Call:  Doing Justice in Indian Country” 
Symposium.  I take full responsibility for all unsupported assertions in this Essay, as they are 
based upon my personal observations during my three decades of working for the Onondaga 
Nation.   
The author wishes to acknowledge and express appreciation for the research assistance 
provided for this Essay by Jenna Gansworth, J. D. Syracuse University Law School, 2012. 
 16. Joseph Heath, Review of the History of the April 1997 Trade and Commerce 
Agreement Among the Traditional Haudenosaunee Councils of Chiefs and New York State 
and the Impact Thereof on Haudenosaunee Sovereignty, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1012 n.2 
(1998).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1022 n.33. 
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Of the issues that face the Onondaga right now, the worst one, the one 
that is weighing on them the heaviest, is the federal district court dismissal 
of their land rights action. This action was but the latest in a series of 
Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions leading to the dismissal of the 
Six Nations’ land claims.  The Second Circuit dismissed the Cayuga 
Nation’s land claim in June of 2005.20  This was only three months after the 
Sherrill decision,21 in which the Supreme Court made up a new equitable 
defense, the “new laches.” We have people around the country who are 
beginning to write about the laches defense and break it down.22  We 
searched for years to figure out what happened to equity here, what 
happened to fairness. Then the Second Circuit sort of educated us about that 
in the summer of 2010, when they dismissed the Oneida land claim that had 
been pending for over thirty years.23    
All of the rules of equity had been thrown out in these rulings, such as 
the balancing of equities; but they have created a new “equity defense” that 
only applies to Indian nations’ land cases and ignores almost every 
historical rule of equity.24  The fact that the State of New York knowingly 
acted illegally — in violation of treaties, the Trade and Intercourse Act, and 
the U.S. Constitution — should have resulted in court recognition that the 
State did not have “clean hands” and should therefore not have been 
entitled to invoke an equitable defense.25  The Haudenosaunee land rights 
cases are based upon illegal takings of the land by New York in the 1790s 
and early 1800s, which the State has not denied, and in other cases, has 
been proven through long factual hearings.  
New York needed the land after the Revolutionary War because it had no 
money and it needed to pay its soldiers. So New York carved up the region 
in maps for military tracts before ever stealing the land.  These takings of 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 21. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).  
 22. See Kathryn Fort, Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the 
Unfortunate Resolution of the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYO. L. REV. 375 (2011) 
[hereinafter Fort, Disruption]; Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None 
Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009); Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida 
Indian Nations of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2005); Wenona T. Singel & 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21 
(2005); Joseph William Singer, Nine-tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred 
Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
 23. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 24. Fort, Disruption, supra note 22, at 402.  
 25. Id. 
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Haudenosaunee lands by New York were such a problem for President 
George Washington and the new government that in 1790, Washington had 
Congress pass the Trade and Intercourse Act (“Act”), which is now 25 
U.S.C. § 177.  Essentially, this is a very simple law that says no party can 
take Indian land without federal involvement and federal ratification.26  
This Act applies to everybody, including the states, and if any party takes 
Indian land in violation of those two simple rules, then the transfers are 
void.   
The Act was directly aimed at New York because New York was taking 
Haudenosaunee lands progressively.27  Washington’s army was losing the 
war in Ohio and he could not afford to have the Senecas and other 
Haudenosaunee warriors join that war.  New York kept taking the land and 
these takings violated the Constitution, the Act, and the last treaty the Six 
Nations made with the United States — the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua.28 
Five of the Six Nations filed land claims.  The Onondagas filed what 
they called a land rights action because they did not claim possession of the 
land, they just asked for a declaratory judgment stating New York had 
violated the law and therefore the transactions were void.29   In response, 
the Second Circuit has made up a new rule that says, ”It is not fair for you 
to bring these issues forward now because this is too disruptive of the 
expectations of the landowners.”  So there only are two elements in this 
“new laches” defense:  (1) A long passage of time, and (2) a judicially 
noticed disruption of the “reasonable expectations” of the non-natives that 
have taken over the land.  
If you think about that, this framework is based upon removal, because 
one of the factors considered in this “new laches” defense is that all Indians 
have “moved away” and non-Indians, almost exclusively, now use the land. 
And disturbingly, these dismissals are being done under the guise of 
“equity.”  The final insult is that this “new laches” defense only applies to 
Indian land claims.30  This is the background and framework that sets up the 
Onondaga’s challenge of arguing the land claim action on Columbus Day in 
the Second Circuit — yes, the irony is profound.31 
                                                                                                                 
 26. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006). 
 27. LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND 
THE RISE OF NEW YORK STATE (2001). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492, at *1 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010).  
 30. Fort, Disruption, supra note 22, at 402.  
 31. One week after the oral argument, the Circuit issued a summary denial of the appeal. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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The Onondaga case was filed just weeks before the City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of New York decision, and so we amended the 
complaint, which eventually was dismissed by the district court after the 
Oneida land claim32 was dismissed in the Second Circuit.   
Of course, we all know that federal Indian law is founded on the 
problematic and racist doctrine of discovery.33  The lands were taken 
illegally, and New York did not even deny any of these facts.  They filed a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)34 (“Rule 12(b)”) motion, which 
essentially says it does not matter if any of the proposed facts are true. The 
State did not deny any of the facts by filing this motion. The State claims 
that it’s just not fair for the nations to bring these illegal land takings up 
anymore, because that is “inequitable” to the current non-Indian 
landowners. 
We (the Onondaga) will see what the Second Circuit does with our case. 
The challenge on this appeal is particularly difficult because the three-judge 
panel cannot rule against their prior rulings and dismissals in Cayuga35 and 
Oneida.36  We are trying to convince the panel that our case is 
fundamentally different.   We did not sue any individuals; we sued the state, 
the city, and the county because we needed lesser governments to remain as 
defendants when the state exercises its Eleventh Amendment immunity. We 
also sued five corporate defendants, and those corporate defendants are the 
major polluters in the area.   
One of them is Honeywell, which is actually owned by Allied Chemical 
(“Allied”). The company kept the Honeywell name because it sounds 
“cleaner.”  Over a century, Allied and Honeywell heavily polluted and 
ruined Onondaga Lake, the sacred lake where the confederacy was born.37 
The lake is the birthplace of western democracy.38  The lake used to be so 
                                                                                                                 
See Onondada Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Nation filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which the Court denied on October 15, 
2013. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 12-1279, 2013 WL 1774236 (U.S. Oct. 15, 
2013). 
 32. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 33. See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 35. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 36. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 37. See LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE IROQUOIS 7 (1851). 
 38. H.R. CON. RES. 331, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988); see DONALD A. GRINDE, THE 
IROQUOIS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN NATION (1977). 
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abundant with fish that people wrote about it in the 1700s;39 but these 
companies have turned it into the most polluted lake in the country.  So 
those are the kinds of defendants we targeted.  However, one of the major 
problems we face now is this “new laches” defense.  
With the loss of its land, the Onondaga and its people have been 
deprived of their spiritual, cultural and historic relationship with the land, 
including the lake and other water bodies.  They can no longer fish, or eat 
any fish they might catch, due to the heavy contamination of mercury and 
twenty-six other toxic chemicals in the lake sediment.  Without legal 
recognition of property rights, the Onondaga have no authority to dictate 
how the land and waters are used.  This means that it is much harder for the 
Onondaga to protect its environmental interests, to protect sacred sites, and 
to protect the unmarked graves of their ancestors.40 
New York is one of only four states in the nation that has no state law 
protecting unmarked graves.41   We also do a lot of repatriation work. We 
try to prevent groups from digging up un-marked graves, which happens 
often in upstate New York these days.  Onondaga used to live on and use 
two and a half million acres running from the eastern end of Lake Ontario42 
through the center of New York, down into Pennsylvania. But Onondaga is 
now confined to 7500 acres.  They used to fish extensively throughout the 
aboriginal territory; one-third of their diet was fish.43  They are now 
confined to a small territory where the only body of water is Onondaga 
Creek.   
I keep using the name Onondaga because their presence and ties to this 
land are very well recognized and accepted by the local people.44 We have a 
very positive relationship with the local governments.  However, in the last 
fifty years, the creek has been turned from a clean trout stream into a 
muddy mess because of a solution salt mining industry upstream.  This 
mined salt was then used in chemical processes that polluted the lake.   
                                                                                                                 
 39. See JOHN BARTRAM, LEWIS EVANS & CONRAD WEISER, A JOURNEY FROM 
PENNSYLVANIA TO ONONDAGA IN 1743 (1973). 
 40. See Christopher A. Amato, Digging Sacred Ground: Burial Site Disturbances and 
the Loss of New York’s Native American Heritage, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2002).  
 41. Id. 
 42. See BARTRAM, EVANS & WEISER, supra note 39. 
 43. Id. at 64-65. 
 44. See Editorial, Sacred Land: Proposal to Return Parcel to Onondagas a Worthy 
Idea, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), May 2, 2011, http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2011/05/ 
sacred_land_proposal_to_return.html.  
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We also have a phenomenon called “mudboils,” which are the result of 
solution salt mining.45 It is a process by which companies have drilled 
hundreds of wells about 1300 feet in the ground and used the water from 
nearby kettle and glacier lakes to flush the salt out of the bottom of the 
valley, leaving this huge vacuum in those salt cavities.46 This process has 
caused subsidence, sinkholes, and rock fissures, leaving gaps in the surface 
rock four feet across.  This kind of damage has interfered with the aquifer 
to the extent that now thirty tons of silt come up spontaneously on a daily 
basis, in an almost geyser-like phenomenon. That silt ends up in the creek.  
We have elders who can remember fishing in the creek at night with a 
kerosene lantern and spearing trout — it was a pretty clean stream.  You 
can’t even see three inches into this creek anymore. 
A lot of our work these days in central New York is fighting 
hydrofracking.47  Chesapeake, Exxon, Halliburton, and other oil and gas 
companies are poised to frack the Finger Lakes.48  For those of you who 
don’t know about hydrofracking, the process uses about eight million 
gallons of water per frack. Companies drill down thousands of feet 
horizontally into the shale formation and break (or fracture) the shale 
formations  using water that is polluted with chemicals. The water then 
comes back up partially radioactive, highly salty with hundreds of 
chemicals.49  
Fracking destroys millions of gallons of water per frack.50   It takes the 
water out of the water cycle and puts it in the ground and buries it, thereby 
permanently removing billions of gallons of fresh water from the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See WILLIAM M. KAPPEL, DONALD A. SHERWOOD & WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HYDROGEOLOGY OF THE TULLY VALLEY AND CHARACTERIZATION OF 
MUDBOIL ACTIVITY, ONONDAGA COUNTY, NEW YORK 2 (Water-Resources Investigations 
Report 96-4043, 1996), available at http://ny.water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri964043/WRIR96-
4043.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Charles Ellis, Protesters in Syracuse Call for Statewide Ban on Hydrofracking, 
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), June 14, 2012, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/ 
06/protesters_in_syracuse_call_fo.html.  
 48. See Andrew Zepp & W. Stuart Schweitzer, Letter to the Editor, Hydrofracking 
Threatens Finger Lakes Region, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Oct. 18, 2011, http://blog. 
syracuse.com/opinion/2011/10/hydrofracking_threatens_finger.html.  
 49. Chris Mooney, The Truth About Fracking, SCI. AM., Nov. 2011, at 81, available at 
http://www.acfan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/truth-casings.pdf.  
 50. Marie Morelli, Environmentalists Meet in Syracuse to Learn About ‘Hydrofracking’ 
and How They Can Try to Stop It, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Oct. 29, 2009, 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/environmentalists_meet_in_syra.html.  
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worldwide water cycle.  We do a lot of work fighting that,51 and we work 
with our non-Native neighbors in accordance with the direction of the 
Council of Chiefs.  This work inspires me to publicly speak three or four 
times a week.  The Chiefs go to the state capitol building in Albany when 
there are rallies. We want to protect the natural world so it can heal, not 
only the natural world, but also repairing the strained relationships resulting 
from centuries of settler invasions. 
Another problem that we are dealing with a little more is gaining 
acceptance of the Onondaga’s traditional governmental structure.  The 
Onondaga does not have Anglo-style courts. It does not have three branches 
of government. It does not have a written constitution. But it does have its 
own traditional customs and institutions.52   
It is incredibly hard for non-Native people to accept how the Chiefs and 
Clan Mothers make decisions.53  We are often confronted with questions 
like, “What is it about these custody arrangements that make you want us to 
honor them?”   So we are working with courts and outside agencies to gain 
acceptance and recognition of Onondaga birth certificates, marriages, and 
dead feasts.54 Dead feasts are the Onondaga’s way of resolving what 
happens to property and land after death. We have encountered some 
difficult issues with the lack of respect and recognition of dead feasts. 
Finally, an issue you may have heard about is that the Onondaga have 
always rejected United States citizenship.  The Onondaga rejected the 1924 
Citizenship Act immediately with a letter to the President.55 An Onondaga 
chief, Jessie Lyons, went to Washington D.C. carrying wampum belts as a 
way of saying, “We are Haudenosaunee citizens, not U.S. citizens.”56  
Nation citizens travel using Onondaga passports and have done so for over 
thirty years.  Now, the United States is refusing to recognize those passports 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Sarah Moses, Onondaga Nation to Host Anti-Hydrofracking Music Festival, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse), Sept. 7, 2012, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/09/ 
onondaga_nation_to_host_anti-h.html. 
 52. Heath, supra note 16. 
 53. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960). 
 54. George v. Pierce, 85 Misc. 105, 127-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  1914). 
 55. Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870 
to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE:  DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 317 (Chief Oren Lyons & John Mohawk eds., 1992). 
 56. Howard McLellan, Indian Magna Carta Writ in Wampum Belts: Six Nations Shows 
Treaty Granting Them Independent Sovereignty as Long as Sun Shines, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
1925, available at http://www.ratical.org/many_worlds/6Nations/WampumBelts.html. 
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and is preventing them from traveling internationally.57  We do a lot of 
work in the United Nations.   The Onondaga’s lacrosse team competes on 
the international level with the United States, Canada, and other countries.  
The tribe just won a bronze medal in the world games this summer in 
Europe, but traveling with their own passports has become more and more 
of a challenge.    
Those are the issues that we work with every day.  There are many 
others, but I have a very limited amount of time. 
Thank you for listening. 
Pat Sekaquaptewa, Executive Director, Nakwatsvewat Institute 
My name is Pat Sekaquaptewa.  I am a member of the Hopi Tribe and 
the Village of Hotevilla, located in northeastern Arizona.  I currently serve 
as the Executive Director of the Nakwatsvewat Institute, a non-profit 
committed to working with tribes to further their justice, governance, and 
educational institutions.  I have also served for five years as the Executive 
Director of the UCLA School of Law’s Native Nations Institute and its 
Tribal Legal Development Clinic.  I have also served as an Appellate 
Justice for a number of tribal courts, including my own.   
I was asked to speak today in response to Professor Frickey’s 
observation that federal judges have no way to have a broader, balanced 
view of tribal institutions.  Professor Frickey felt there is a failure of 
scholarship in federal Indian law in that the work does not grapple with the 
law on the ground in Indian Country.  He also felt that the federal courts 
and Congress need strong contextual arguments to show how tribal 
institutions operate.  As I was preparing my remarks, something really 
jumped out at me.  As legal scholars we are stuck in the middle.  Even 
Native legal scholars are stuck in the middle.  We have powerful decision 
makers in Congress and the federal judiciary whose decision-making seems 
purely discretionary to us in Indian Country.  What they seem to be looking 
for is a good story that will tug at the heart so they will be compelled to 
make or find some law in favor of the tribal communities.   
This does not feel like a rule of law kind of thing or a justice kind of 
thing.  So, as advocates and legal scholars, we tell a good story in order to 
win battles for our people; but we are stuck in the middle because in tribal 
communities, even our own leaders and community members are very 
suspicious of us (lawyers), for good reason.  All you have to do is walk 
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back through the cases in federal Indian law to see it.  Also, every tribal 
community has its own tragic history with non-Indians.  So how are legal 
scholars supposed to develop scholarship for use by congressmen and 
federal judges?  How are we supposed to tell an accurate story if we can’t 
get access to the information from our own communities?   
It is simultaneously true that in the U.S. legal system, the law is made 
and put in books. But in Indian Country, the law is in the people and in their 
relationships.58 I do a lot of work with custom and tradition as law in Indian 
Country.  Many tribal constitutions, codes, resolutions, and court rules 
recognize custom law as a valid source of law that is enforceable in tribal 
courts.59   
The U.S. federal system also recognizes tribal custom law to the extent 
that it recognizes the case law coming out of the tribal court systems — and 
in certain areas it is recognized and applied via federal statutes.60  But 
where does custom law come from?  It resides in the people.  It resides in 
the practices and norms that come out of the community.  Many of the 
elders know it.  Many of the community members live it.  The law is in the 
people and it is reinforced in their everyday lives.  You can’t look it up on 
your computer.  You can’t Google it easily — or maybe you Google it and 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See generally Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in the Finding, Definition and 
Consideration of Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319 (2007-
2008).   
 59. See Hopi Tribal Resolution H-12-76, § 2(a) (“The Courts of the Hopi Tribe, in 
deciding matters of both substance and procedure, in cases otherwise properly before the 
Courts of the Hopi Tribe, shall look to and give weight as precedent to, the following: (1) the 
Hopi Constitution and Bylaws; (2) Ordinances of the Hopi Tribe Council; (3) Resolutions of 
the Hopi Tribe Council; (4) Customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi Tribe; (5) Laws, 
rules, and regulations of the Federal Government and the cases interpreting such . . . .; (6) 
The laws and rules, and cases interpreting such laws and rules, of the state of Arizona; [and] 
(7) The Common Law.”).  However, under section 2(b), the Courts of the Hopi Tribe shall 
not recognize nor apply any federal, state, or common law rule or procedure which is 
inconsistent with either the spirit or the letter of the Hopi Constitution, ordinances, 
resolutions, or the custom, traditions, or culture of the Hopi Tribe.  Id. § 2(b).  Under Hopi 
case law, federal and state laws are considered persuasive but not mandatory authority.  Hopi 
Tribe v. Consolidated Cases of Mahkewa, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6144, 6145 (Hopi App. Ct. 
1995).  The Hopi Appellate Court has also held that relevant custom must be considered 
before the application of foreign law (federal and state laws) in the Hopi tribal courts.  Hopi 
Indian Credit Ass’n v. Thomas, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6039, 6040 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996); see also 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2007) (discussing comparative tribal provisions); Sekaquaptewa, 
supra note 58, at 380-81 (discussing comparative provisions establishing tribal custom).  
 60. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (2006) (defining extended family member “by law or 
custom of the Indian child’s tribe” under The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978).   
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you don’t know when you are seeing it — but it is there.  You can’t look it 
up on Lexis or Westlaw unless one of us has written a law review article. I 
do want to acknowledge those lawyers and practitioners who are doing case 
studies with particular tribes and who are trying to share their observations 
because that is extremely valuable.61  How are we supposed to 
communicate the importance of tribal values, practices, and motivations if 
we can’t gain access to the information from our own communities?   
There are some basic facts of life given this dilemma.  Legal scholars 
have to earn trust and access in tribal communities to get the information 
we would then put in law review articles.  We also must provide a 
compelling context for our congressmen and federal judges and for 
lawmakers on other levels.  And we must simultaneously educate people 
about tribal institutions and values.  But often, the compelling context is 
more important strategically than the education because if federal judges 
are not swayed by a good story in the context of their value system, they 
may not care much about the information.  
So that makes it very important for us to provide a compelling context to 
outside lawmakers and judges.  Otherwise, we can’t further our 
communities’ interests.  Even Native scholars must gain access to tribal 
communities to get information in order to build and describe these 
contexts to others.  Successful legal scholars today earn trust and access to 
tribal communities by exchanging services and by helping tribes develop 
their infrastructure.62  We don’t get to extract information from tribal 
communities because we went to school and are very smart and can publish 
articles. We have to trade for it.  We have to earn trust and live up to the 
access that we will have in our tribal communities.   
I made a list of strategies or recommendations for furthering this access.  
The first is that faculty in law schools should incentivize research and 
publication by their legal clinicians working with Indian Country.  This 
assumes that law schools have legal clinics serving Indian Country.  What 
is true for Native legal scholars is true for their academic institutions — 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM 
CLAN TO COURT (1975); Justin B. Richland, “What Are You Going to Do with the Village’s 
Knowledge?” Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
235 (2005); Robert Yazzie, “Watch Your Six”: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of 25 Years 
of Indian Law, Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497 (1998-
1999); Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker Division: An Integrated, 
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 297 (2000).  
 62. See Indian Law Clinics, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute. 
org/lists/clinics.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).  
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access requires trust that must be earned with service.  Legal scholars 
should also consider serving as tribal judges, and I know many do.  If there 
is a problem with judging and writing outside Indian Country, a case could 
be made for why it is imperative to do it within and among tribal 
communities when it is done carefully.   
The third recommendation is that legal scholars should participate in 
tribal law clinics and in tribal court clerkship programs as supervisors or 
advisors so they get some sense of how disputes arise and how case law is 
argued in tribal court.  The fourth recommendation is that legal scholars, 
clinicians, and their students get off their computers and go to the tribal 
communities.  I know that one of our U.S. Supreme Court Justices visited 
the Hopi. This was likely part of the Tribal Supreme Court Project, a joint 
project by the Native American Rights Fund (“NARF”) and the National 
Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”), which tasked itself with 
educating the justices and other federal judges on key aspects of federal 
Indian law. In the summer of 2001, Justices O’Connor and Breyer took part 
in a historic visit to Indian Country to observe tribal justice systems.63  
Justice O’Connor actually showed up on the Hopi Reservation and met with 
a Hopi judge to learn how our tribal court system works first-hand.  Even 
our U.S. Supreme Court Justices understood that this was an important 
thing to do.   
The fifth recommendation has to do with formal research.  In researching 
tribal court cases, legal scholars need to be careful to look at the entire case 
file including the full recordings and transcripts at the trial level.  There is 
so much filtering that goes on, particularly if we have non-Indian lawyers 
and judges working in tribal courts.  Consequently they often inadvertently 
filter out (or never see) the issues central to the tribal parties and relevant 
custom law considerations.  Further, when tribal judges (and I might argue 
any judges) write their final opinions and orders, you are getting a 
somewhat subjective view of the conflict given their gender and life 
experiences and even of the law, which very often excludes custom law 
issues raised by the parties.64  Where non-Indian lawyers and judges work 
in tribal court, much gets “lost in translation,” so it is very important to look 
                                                                                                                 
 63. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, TRIBAL SUPREME COURT PROJECT: TEN YEAR REPORT 2 
(Dec. 2011), available at http://sct.narf.org/updatememos/tsct-10-year-report.pdf.   
 64. See, e.g., Smith v. James, 2 Am. Tribal Law 319 (Hopi Ct. App. 1999) 
Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 335-65 (describing a trial judge framing a new customary 
rule for women’s property rights but from a male perspective, and I would argue to leave 
open the possibility of recognizing potential male property right by use).  
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at the whole record if you are going to truly understand tribal conflicts and 
court cases.   
Finally, we need to expand the nature of our research and work with 
researchers from other disciplines.  There are other disciplines doing 
empirical research that is critical in Indian Country.65  The more work I do 
as a mediator with my own tribe, the more I wish I had a Ph.D. in 
psychology.  While there are no current reliable statistics, given both the 
nature of the disputes that we handled in mediations and the feedback from 
our community mediators, we believe that many, if not most of our people 
and our leaders, have experienced or are experiencing trauma in their lives 
including: 1) child abuse, 2) domestic violence, and 3) alcoholism.  I also 
perceive, given my work with tribes nationally, that child sexual abuse is a 
very big problem in Indian Country.  I am by no means the first to make 
note of this.66  One expert describes the multiple risk factors that contribute 
to a greater incidence of child sexual abuse on Indian reservations. Those 
include poverty, unemployment, familial stresses, violence, geographic and 
social isolation of families, weakened family structure due to a history of 
federal policies such as mandatory placement of Indian children in boarding 
schools and the Indian Adoption Project.67 These federal policies that 
weaken family structures contribute to the breakdown of extended families, 
the loss of traditional child-rearing practices, the absence of good parental 
modeling, and newly learned dysfunctional behaviors such as sexual abuse 
and physical punishment.  Native American communities also have a higher 
percentage of children, with younger than average populations.68  These 
layers of trauma related to child abuse, domestic violence, and alcoholism 
are affecting every aspect of our governance, our criminal justice systems, 
and of course our family and work life. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT (2008).   
 66. See Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian 
Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 91-95 (2001) 
(citing old and conflicting statistics on Indian child sexual abuse — for a period ending in 
1998, the U.S. Bureau of Justice reported that Native American children experienced 19.8 
cases of sexual abuse per 1000 children, second only to African Americans at 20.7 cases per 
1000 children).  EchoHawk shares the view that many professionals working with tribal 
communities know that existing data is “scant,” and that the existing data fails to accurately 
capture the depth of the problem.  Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See KATHLEEN A. EARLE, CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS & NAT’L INDIAN CHILD 
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Tribes need research in the following areas involving conflict: 
governance (tribal, sub-tribal, inter-tribal, and inter-governmental), property 
(both real and personal), family, youth, and criminal cases.  I also make the 
following observations given my work with my own tribe and over a 
hundred others nationally.   
First, as tribal people, we live in a society of kin, not a society of 
strangers.  What often looks like an arms-length contract dispute is actually 
a family law case in some aspect.  For example, because most Hopis view 
themselves as related by clan, and because the villages, as opposed to the 
Hopi tribal courts, have original jurisdiction over family disputes under 
Article III, Section 2 of the Hopi Constitution, it is common for an 
opposing party in tribal court litigation to claim the court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear a matter because the litigants in a contract dispute are related by 
clan.69  It is also true that Hopi land disputes are invariably family disputes 
where the traditional Hopi land tenure system is arguably based on clan use 
rights.70   
Second, some tribes have hybrid constitutions and governmental 
institutions.  The constitutions or other laws recognize governance powers 
in both traditional leaders and in elected leaders simultaneously.  The Hopi 
Tribe, by way of example, has an Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) 
Constitution,71 but it recognizes the authority of each village’s traditional 
leader to certify representatives to the tribal council.72 If any of you have 
been watching the news on the Hopi within the last five or six years, you 
know that we had a complete meltdown, largely over this issue, and our 
government fell apart.73 There are perpetual tensions, both with respect to 
values and with respect to what form governance structures should take in 
the present and future given these hybrids.   
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Coin v. Mowa, 25 Indian. L. Rep. 6208, 6208-10 (Hopi Ct. App. 1997).  
 70. See, e.g., Smith v. James, 2 Am. Tribal Law 319 (Hopi Ct. App. 1999); see also 
Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 332-46. 
 71. See CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/ 
IRA/hopicons.html.  
 72. Id. art. IV, § 4.   
 73. See S.J. Wilson, Hopi Tribal Council Suspends Chairman Nuvamsa — Nuvamsa 
Asks Federal Government for an Investigation, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER, Sept. 30, 2008, 
http://www.navajohopiobserver.com/main.asp?Search=1&ArticleID=7231&SectionID=1&S
ubSectionID=1&S=1; see also Ben Nuvamsa, What I Wish I Knew Before I Took Office:  
Emerging Leaders Seminar, Native Nations Institute for Leadership Management and 
Policy — University of Arizona (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://nnidatabase.org/db/vid 
eo/ben-nuvamsa-what-i-wish-i-knew-i-took-office (video presentation). 
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Third, the currency in tribal communities may include far more than 
money or property.  With the Hopi for example, it is arguable that even 
today the central currency is ceremonial knowledge and participation. Much 
has been written on the Hopi villages’ elaborate ceremonial cycles.74  There 
is an intimate connection between authority, property use rights, and Hopi 
ceremonialism.75  If one doesn’t understand the connections between 
authority, kinship, ceremonialism, and economy in a particular tribe, many 
of the values and applications of both western and tribal law will not make 
sense.   
Fourth, in most tribes there is a law of reciprocal obligations in 
operation — a sort of kin-based customary tort law that floats underneath 
the western-influenced tribal codes and court system.  These obligations are 
delimited by the way one is related to another, and breaches inform who is 
right and who is wrong and how one should be punished or rewarded.   
Fifth, there may be multiple traditional and secular entities legitimately 
vying for authority in the eyes of the tribal public.  At Hopi, we find tribal, 
village, and clan entities sharing or vying for exclusive authority over use 
rights and property rights.76  When you talk about property law in Indian 
Country, there are multiple authorities that may have a say about how 
property is used or transferred, even given a federal land trust system.  In 
the eyes of the tribal public, there also may be another body of customary 
property law operating underneath.   
Sixth, in many tribal communities, family equals clan/band/village, etc. 
and clan/band/village, etc. equals government. You cannot understand tribal 
government unless you understand local government (clan/band/village, 
etc.).   
I have a big list of observations, but this gives you a sampling of what 
tribal legal scholars have to be aware of in accessing and reporting on tribal 
legal conflicts before they ever come into tribal court.  Tribal conflicts are 
simply much more complex and nuanced than one might observe from 
looking at tribal court opinions and orders. 
Finally, I would like to talk about the types of research and publications 
that I would like to see based on what we are seeing on the ground in Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See, e.g. MISCHA TITIEV, OLD ORAIBI 103-78 (1972) (discussing basic patterns, 
underlying concepts of Hopi ceremonies, and what he calls “the Kachina cult”).  
 75. Id. at 181-200; see also PETER M. WHITELEY, THE ORAYVI SPLIT: A HOPI 
TRANSFORMATION: PART I: STRUCTURE AND HISTORY 21-31 (2008). 
 76. Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 319, 346-51 (discussing legal levels and multiple 
legal systems); see also PETER M. WHITELEY, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY 80-104 
(1998).  
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Country.  I think there needs to be more thinking on the structure and 
process of therapeutic dockets in tribal trial courts, like drug and mental 
health courts.  There needs to be more on conflict theory and transformative 
mediation methods in working with disputes that involve ongoing 
relationships in tribal community. Custom law is more alive in mediation 
than it is in tribal adjudication.   
We also need to have more case studies focusing on living custom law 
coming from specific tribes and specific conflict issues, and we need some 
decoding for outside judges and lawmakers.  I suspect that we will see one 
track of law review articles for the community and its needs, and a second 
track of law review articles that decodes the research for the non-Indian 
public and federal decision makers.  We must also write about what tribal 
community members perceive to be needed in Indian Country versus what 
the outside lawmakers and judges say.  We badly need an internal forum to 
dialogue about internal value and policy conflicts (for example, to game or 
not to game). 
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share my 
experiences and my views in response to Professor Frickey’s valuable 
observation that we desperately need to communicate the tribal realities to 
those who have so much control over tribal lives and resources. 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Sarah Krakoff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School 
Thanks again to Berkeley, Mary Louise, and everyone who helped to 
organize this conference.  I also want to thank my co-organizers who aren’t 
up here on the panel.  One of them is Scott Williams, and the other is Bob 
Anderson. Professor Anderson is visiting at Harvard this fall and couldn’t 
make the cross-country trip.  It was the three of us, talking with Mary 
Louise, who conceptualized and organized the panel and invited our 
wonderful guests.   
Our idea for this part of the conference was to hear from tribal people — 
both elected officials and community leaders — about the challenges of 
doing environmental work in Indian Country.  If there will ever be 
environmental justice in Indian Country, it will be because of them.  
Without their voices and activism, the default practices of using tribal lands 
and resources for the needs of development, mostly by non-Indians, will 
continue unchallenged.  There are lines of continuity between the content of 
this panel and Judge Fletcher’s talk yesterday about sacred sites. Those 
include the relentless pursuit of natural resource development, the 
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accompanying problem of agency capture when that development is on 
public lands, and the translation problems tribes face when challenging 
development in judicial forums, which all pose significant challenges.  To 
add to the complexity, the translation problem is multi-layered, as you will 
hear from the amazing speakers today.  For some tribal members, getting 
through to their own tribal governments can pose threshold challenges.  If 
that difficulty can be overcome, translating to outsiders — whether courts, 
legislators or agencies — is the next daunting step in the process. At that 
stage, lawyers and academics might be brought in to assist, but our work is 
only as good as the work of the tribal and community leaders with whom 
we are engaged in these efforts. 
That is why we structured the panel the way that we did.  So before 
turning the rest of this time over to our speakers, I thought I would just add 
a few more thoughts about the larger framing of this conference and how 
we might think about what it means to heed Phil Frickey’s call.   
I think there are several ways to make our scholarly work relevant, and 
they take very different forms.  First, there is the work academics do that 
targets an academic audience, and there are reasons for that.  Some of the 
reasons are fairly instrumental. We have to get tenure and, like it or not, we 
are mindful of U.S. News rankings and that kind of thing.  But there are 
other more important reasons having to do with the nature of scholarship 
itself.  We are writing — and should be doing so — for the long term.  
Sometimes our work takes many years (and pages) to work through 
complicated and subtle concepts. A great deal of the scholarly work 
undertaken by American Indian law professors is very engaged work, even 
if it is of a more remote and sequestered nature. A scholarly project often 
begins with a puzzle relevant to contemporary American Indian law; but 
piecing the puzzle together may take years of painstaking historical 
research, mountains of data, pages of dense theoretical analysis, or all of the 
above.  So, while almost all American Indian law scholars are motivated by 
the larger question of doing justice in Indian Country, that does not mean 
our work can or will instantly achieve such an outcome.   
It was refreshing to hear Judge Fletcher talk about the very limited extent 
to which judges actually read law review articles, and who can blame them?  
They are very long with a lot of footnotes.  They are not often directly or 
instrumentally helpful, and they are not supposed to be.  But in the long 
run, if done well and in the right spirit, they provide deep context for 
practical and instrumental problem solving, and they do so in a way no 
other resources can.   
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The second way scholars can engage with legal issues is through a 
category of scholarship I think of as “service scholarship,” which includes 
treatises as well as shorter, more practical pieces that can be used by 
legislators, policy makers, and judges.  To do this work well, one needs a 
deeper intellectual grounding in the field, which can only be achieved by 
spending a lot of time doing the first kind of scholarship.  A great treatise, 
in my opinion, can only be written after being steeped in a field’s 
complexities.  Similarly, someone who knows the long, impractical context 
of a subject can best write a short, practical guide. It is my rough sense that 
American Indian law professors do as much or more service scholarship as 
any other sub-category of legal academics.  As a group, we tend to be very 
engaged with the communities in which our work has the biggest impact, 
and therefore take the service obligations to heart, including how we spend 
our time writing.   
Third, teaching is a way to engage immediate problems and issues in the 
field, and includes recruiting students to write shorter papers that provide 
direct assistance to tribes and tribal communities.  To provide just one 
example, I took my seminar class on a field trip to the Navajo Nation, 
where we met and stayed with two of our panelists here today. They were 
gracious enough to host us on their lands in the Hard Rock Chapter.  
Several of my students dramatically changed their paper topics after hearing 
about the legal challenges confronting the people of Black Mesa.  They 
wanted their papers to matter, and I have little doubt that in the end they 
did.   
Finally, many American Indian law professors engage in pro bono work, 
often in ways that connect with our scholarship.  So another way to make 
the first category — the longer articles and books that take years to write — 
relevant is to do pro bono work that draws on that knowledge.  Whenever 
my colleagues and I assist practicing lawyers in this way, we are struck by 
the help we can provide to the pressing issues that practitioners and their 
clients face every day.   
In all these ways, academics can contribute to the goal of achieving 
justice in Indian Country. With so many options, there are no excuses for 
not bending at least some of our work toward that end. As we hear our 
panelists talk about these hard and complex issues they have been working 
on in their communities, we can think about how we can engage our own 
communities in one or more of these ways.  Maybe we won’t have to wait 
for them to tell us how we can make our work relevant.  Just listen closely 
and then go do it!   
*** 
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Thank you to all of our panelists.  I just have a few observations about 
the themes I have heard throughout all the presentations.  One is how clear 
it is that contemporary American Indian law is, if seen in its best light, an 
attempt at reconciliation.  Indian law today has to reconcile the laws and 
policies of the past, which were largely rationalizations for the non-Indian 
settlement of the continent, with contemporary values and goals of tribal 
survivalism and self-determination.  Reckoning with Indian law’s darker 
origins is not merely a paper exercise; it entails confronting the violence 
and pain inflicted on tribal people.  We heard quite explicitly about Indian 
law’s violent past from all of the speakers in different ways. Hawk 
Rosales’s story stands out in particular as a personal one and, yet, not a 
singular one.   
In almost every Native family, there are similar stories written on the 
backs of grandmothers, grandfathers, aunts, and uncles.  This is a difficult 
and complicated backdrop against which to work out pressing 
contemporary problems of environmental justice. Most of us cannot do the 
work that was just described by the members of the panel.  Most of us are 
not equipped to do that work because we are not from tribal communities.  
But we can provide the translation, the technical assistance, and often the 
explanation of how and why these conflicts have arisen in the form they 
have today.  
Think about Madelyn’s story, too.  If you know the legal doctrine of 
Indian water rights, you might be very puzzled as to why her tribe cannot 
immediately fend off the Southern Nevada Water Authority.  After all, the 
Winters doctrine says tribes have a priority right to water to fulfill the 
purpose of their reservation lands, and that right predates all other western 
water rights.77  So what is the problem?  Why can the tribe not assert its 
legal right and block the actions that would syphon its water to Las Vegas?   
The problem is that Winters rights clash with our western water law 
doctrine of prior appropriation, which gives priority to water users who 
divert and use the water first.  More importantly, the prior appropriation 
doctrine is not just the law, it is the practice on the ground. As the cliché 
goes, water flows uphill toward money.  The first (and most powerful) 
entity to divert water often wins, regardless of how strong a tribe’s paper 
rights might be. 
This is evident in Nicole and Marshall’s story, too.  The Navajo Nation, 
notwithstanding an 1868 treaty that guarantees higher priority water rights 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (finding that tribes have reserved 
rights to water that date to the time their reservations were established).   
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than any other entity in the four corners region, is last in line to obtain 
rights to surface water and even harder pressed to protect its sacred 
groundwater. The natural resources of the Colorado Plateau, and Black 
Mesa in particular, have been exported to support development outside of 
Indian Country, leaving the Navajo and Hopi communities to struggle for 
water and energy to meet their basic needs.  Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Las 
Vegas have turned repeatedly to the coal-rich high desert plateau without 
heed of the effects on communities that call the area home.   
So these are just a few among many themes that the speakers have 
presented to us.  They give us some ideas about how we can help at the 
margins to solve some of these puzzles and engage in acts of translation for 
legislators and judges.  
Hawk Rosales, Executive Director, InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness 
Council 
Good morning. My name is Hawk Rosales. I am the Executive Director 
of the InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council. We are based in 
Mendocino County and we are a nonprofit consortium of ten federally 
recognized tribes,78 founded in 1986 for the purpose of cultural 
conservation of ancestral tribal lands in southern Humboldt County and 
Mendocino County. Today I am going to talk about how we have been 
working with legal scholars and using appropriate legal tools to secure 
recognition, for the first time in the State of California, for the aboriginal 
rights of the tribes affected by the Marine Life Protection Act (“MLPA”) 
process in the marine areas of Northern California.  
I am going to give some background about how our organization was 
formed and the type of work we do. The Sinkyone tribal ancestral territory 
is a fairly large area of land. The upper part of this territory is located in 
Humboldt County and the lower part is located in Mendocino County. This 
is a very remote and beautiful coastal area within the redwood rainforest 
ecosystem. It cannot be compared to any other place in the world. This is 
the area in which we work.  
                                                                                                                 
 78. The ten member tribes of the InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council are: Cahto 
Tribe; Coyote Valley Reservation; Hopland Band of Pomo Indians; Pinoleville Pomo 
Nation; Potter Valley Tribe; Redwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Robinson 
Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians; Round Valley Indian Tribes; Scotts Valley Band of Pomo 
Indians; and Sherwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians. Each of these tribes is a 
sovereign nation that retains ancient ancestral and cultural ties to the aboriginal Sinkyone 
tribal territory. 
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A number of Sinkyone stream valleys flow down into the ocean. The sea 
cliffs here are about 2000 feet in elevation; but these coastal streams go 
back into the mountains for many miles, and contain a huge variety of 
wildlife and cultural resources that the tribes still depend on for subsistence. 
Bear Harbor is located toward the northern end of the Sinkyone territory. 
The Roosevelt elk are an important part of the redwood and marine 
ecosystem. Every year, these elk go swimming about a mile out into the 
ocean. We don’t know how many of them make it back. We haven’t 
counted, but apparently most of them do. This practice may be part of their 
instinct because they are related to the caribou, which also travel between 
islands farther north.   
The redwood tree is a very sacred part of the tribal culture in this region. 
Some of these redwoods are 5000 years old, and every aspect of the tribal 
culture is dependent upon this tree. In the 1960s, most of the old growth 
along the Sinkyone coastline was still intact. Looking at a photo taken 
fifteen years later, massive clear cutting is evident throughout all of these 
watersheds. The result has been severe degradation of the entire ecosystem. 
To this day, we are still dealing with the cumulative effects.  
In 1983, a lawsuit was brought by the Environmental Information 
Protection Center and the International Indian Treaty Council against the 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation (“Georgia-Pacific”), the California Board of 
Forestry, and the California Department of Forestry to force compliance 
with existing state standards for protection of natural and cultural 
resources.79  Also known as the “Sally Bell Case,” the lawsuit charged the 
landowner and responsible state agencies with violations of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).80  
Georgia-Pacific, which owned the property, was found responsible for 
knowingly destroying Native American cultural resources. In 1985, the 
California appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.81 Eventually, the 
case resulted in a revision of the timber harvest rules for California. The 
Sally Bell Grove was saved as a result of that lawsuit. The entire grove 
contains about ninety acres of old growth. Only 2% of the old growth 
redwoods remain in this area. The Sinkyone Council was formed one year 
after the Sally Bell Case to address permanent protection and restoration of 
Sinkyone lands, including those affected by the lawsuit. 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Johnson, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st 1985). 
 80. See Epic v. Johnson I, ENVTL. PROTECTION INFO. CENTER, http://www.wildcaliforn 
ia.org/case-history/case-documentation/1980s/epic-v-johnson-i/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 81. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 519-20.  
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The Sinkyone Council has been working all of these years to move 
toward environmental and social justice for tribal peoples who were 
removed from this land. Following the initial genocide of the Sinkyone and 
nearby tribes, the relative that is so sacred to the Indian people — the 
redwood tree — was cut down without restraint. Sally Bell was a survivor 
of one of the many massacres that occurred in this area during the mid-
1800s, and the woman in whose honor the lawsuit was named. In the late 
1920s, Sally Bell recounted the massacre:  
My grandfather and all of my family — my mother, my father, 
and we — were around the house and not hurting anyone. Soon, 
about ten o’clock in the morning, some white men came. They 
killed my grandfather and my mother and my father. I saw them 
do it. I was a big girl at the time. Then they killed my baby sister 
and cut her heart out and threw it in the brush where I ran and 
hid. My little sister was a baby, just crawling around. I didn’t 
know what to do. I was so scared that I guess I just hid there a 
long time with my little sister’s heart in my hands. I felt so bad 
and I was so scared that I just couldn’t do anything else. Then I 
ran into the woods and hid there for a long time. I lived there a 
long time with a few other people who had got away. We lived 
on berries and roots and we didn’t dare build a fire because the 
white men might come back after us. So we ate anything that we 
could get . . . .82  
Unfortunately, this was not an unusual story for California Indian people 
during that time. Many tribes were completely annihilated. But there were 
survivors, and those survivors are the forebears of Indian families who 
became members of the ten tribes that comprise the Sinkyone Council tribal 
consortium. Since our inception, our effort has been to reclaim traditional 
tribal stewardship for Sinkyone lands by the original descendants through 
restoring the tribal presence and the natural ecosystem. In 1997 we 
purchased 3845 acres of ancestral Sinkyone land from The Trust for Public 
Land, and thereby established the first ever inter-tribal Indian wilderness 
area on the Sinkyone coastal lands that were sold by Georgia-Pacific 
following the Sally Bell Case decision. 
It is important to understand that Congress refused to ratify all eighteen 
of the treaties agreed to and signed in good faith between California Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 82. GLADYS A. NOMLAND, SINKYONE NOTES 166-67 (1935). 
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tribes and the federal government.83 As a result, aboriginal rights of 
California tribes are not recognized outside of reservation boundaries. It has 
been a tremendous challenge to get these rights recognized by the State of 
California. This has been the focus of much of our effort over the past few 
years: returning tribal presence to these lands in order to bring back the 
spirituality and the cultural practices has been the main focus of our work 
during the last twenty years. We have conducted a lot of salmon restoration 
work, and we focus on several areas of traditional cultural uses on this 
land.84  
We work with many partners, and all of this work that we have been 
doing has led to our engagement in the MLPA process. We have many 
restoration projects in the Sinkyone coastal watersheds. We have partnered 
with California State Parks in removing old logging roads to address mass 
erosion problems. All of these projects are directly related to protecting and 
improving the health of the ocean. In our work to honor and protect the 
cultural ecology of this coastal area, we began engaging in 2009 with the 
MLPA Initiative.  
The MLPA is a California statute passed by the state legislature in 1999 
and is designed to protect the ocean ecosystem. It did not include any 
consideration for the tribes and their traditional uses of the marine protected 
areas (“MPAs”) that the State of California intended to establish up and 
down the coastline. When this process reached the north coast, the tribes 
began organizing, meeting, and attending every single one of the blue 
ribbon task force, regional stakeholder group, and other MLPA Initiative 
meetings. Twenty-six federally recognized tribes in the north coast were 
affected.85  In the regions to the south, there was a much more limited 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Who We Are, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.bia. 
gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/Pacific/WeAre/index.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 84. Hawk Rosales, Executive Director, InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council, 
Address at the University of California Berkeley Law Symposium: Doing Justice in Indian 
Country (Sept. 27-28, 2012) (on file with author).  These areas include, as listed in the 
September 28, 2012 Sinkyone Council PowerPoint Presentation:  traditional harvest of 
culturally important plants and animals; ceremony; protection and stewardship of sacred and 
other cultural sites; restoration of the land’s cultural/ecological values (water quality, fish 
habitat, basketmaking plant stands, endangered species’ habitat, etc.); reintroduction of 
traditional fire management regime; reduction of fuel-load hazardous areas; cultural-
recreational activities; cultural-educational programs; youth and elders gatherings; and 
backcountry recreation, including hiking trails network. 
 85. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/ 
cpso/biaind.pdf.  The counties affected and names of the tribes are: 
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presence of tribes in the coastal areas. The game completely changed when 
California introduced the MLPA Initiative to the north coast.   
Since the beginning of time, the tribes have been the careful stewards of 
their coastal lands and waters. Their stewardship has enabled diversity and 
abundance of a multitude of marine species and habitats. The wellbeing of 
plant and animal communities has been made possible for generations 
through the tribes’ implementation of traditional ecological knowledge. The 
State’s agencies and resource managers are only now beginning to 
understand this complex and vital dynamic.  
During this process, we worked with many allies to convince California 
to change the marine-take regulations so that there would be a formal 
recognition of tribal use rights with respect to traditional and 
noncommercial fishing and the gathering and harvesting of shellfish, 
finfish, and marine plants. We have been able to change the regulations, 
through a very long process and with a lot of help from people like Sarah 
Krakoff, Curtis Berkey, Scott Williams, and many others, who graciously 
provided legal opinions on how California could structure a tribal marine-
use regulation. It has been a time-consuming process, but on June 6 of this 
year [2012], the California Fish and Game Commission finally approved a 
regulation that formally recognizes and protects tribal traditional uses in 
each one of the State Marine Conservation Areas (“SMCAs”) that were 
established in the north coast.  
In our research to achieve this success, we found many old tribal 
photographs that showed families living on the coast — right at the 
proposed MPAs — in a traditional manner up until the 1920s and 1930s. 
These are the families that today are represented through the Sinkyone 
Council. They continue to use these areas as their ancestors did, and they 
always will do so.  
                                                                                                                 
Mendocino County (ten tribes): Cahto Tribe; Coyote Valley Reservation; Guidiville 
Rancheria; Hopland Band of Pomo Indians; Manchester Band of Pomo Indians; Pinoleville 
Pomo Nation; Potter Valley Tribe; Redwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Round 
Valley Indian Tribes; Sherwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians. 
 Lake County (seven tribes): Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians; Elem Indian Colony of 
Pomo Indians; Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake; Lower Lake Rancheria; Middletown 
Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians; Scotts Valley 
Band of Pomo Indians. 
 Humboldt County (five tribes): Bear River Band of Rohnerville Rancheria; Big Lagoon 
Rancheria; Blue Lake Rancheria; Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of Trinidad 
Rancheria; Wiyot Tribe. 
 Del Norte County (four tribes): Elk Valley Rancheria; Resighini Rancheria; Smith River 
Rancheria; Yurok Tribe. 
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This victory is an example of a successful collaborative approach that 
required carefully negotiating with California through administrative 
channels, instead of through litigation or legislation. It was all about 
building a solution whereby we could achieve dual protections for the 
environment and the tribes’ traditional subsistence uses. All of the uses 
allowed by California before these new regulations go into effect will 
remain in place for the tribes that are listed for these MPAs. But the public 
will not be allowed the same extractive uses in those MPAs.  
For the first time, north coast tribes have received formal recognition by 
California of their marine use rights through a new and distinct category of 
use that stands separate from the recreational and commercial categories. 
We view this as a huge victory for California tribes. The MLPA process has 
been far from perfect, and not everyone was happy with the outcome; but in 
the southern bio-region of the north coast (from the mouth of the Mattole 
River to Point Arena) seventeen federally recognized tribes in Mendocino 
and Lake Counties were included in this area’s six new SMCAs, and one 
federally recognized tribe in Humboldt County was included in one of those 
SMCAs. Four federally recognized tribes in Humboldt and Del Norte 
Counties were included in four new SMCAs and one new state marine 
recreational management area in the north coast’s northern bio-region (from 
the Oregon border to the mouth of the Mattole River).86  
Tribal engagement in the MLPA process demonstrates that when people 
pull together and work towards something good, both environmental 
protection and social justice can be achieved. And, we can change the way 
the government views tribal sovereignty and aboriginal rights. 
 CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Sarah Deer, Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law87 
Author’s preface: These remarks were originally delivered in September 
of 2012.  On March 7, 2013, President Obama signed the 2013 Violence 
Against Women Act Reauthorization (“VAWA 2013”). Contained within 
that legislation is a partial reauthorization of tribal criminal jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Northern California Marine Protected Areas, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/mlpa/ncmpas_list.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (final approved 
regulation, including maps and details regarding tribal take). 
 87. Citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma.  Mvto (thank you) to the 
many Native women survivors and advocates who have informed my work on this issue.  I 
am grateful to Anna R. Light, who provided invaluable research assistance in finalizing 
these remarks for publication. 
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over non-Indians, which is a topic covered in this short essay.  VAWA 2013 
recognizes that the inherent right of tribal nations includes criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants accused of domestic violence.  The 
topics discussed in this essay — statistical evidence, interdiction of 
violence, and protecting Native women — will likely become even more 
important as tribal leaders and jurists consider the future of tribal self-
determination and seek to realize the full potential of the changes created 
by VAWA 2013. 
Thank you very much for this opportunity.  This is my first visit to 
Berkeley and I am grateful that I have been invited to share some 
information about my work. 
At the outset, I would like to lay some foundation for my perspective on 
Indian law.  My introduction to law was based on my experience in victim 
advocacy.  Prior to going to law school (and during law school), I worked at 
a rape crisis center in Lawrence, Kansas as an advocate for six years.  Many 
of the women I worked with were Native students at Haskell Indian Nations 
University in Lawrence who had either been assaulted prior to coming to 
Haskell or had been assaulted on campus.  Through that work I began to see 
a possible path of working in the legal system to help those women.  My 
plan was originally to work as a sex crimes prosecutor.   
I ended up straying from that particular career path, but most of my work 
continues to be informed by the experience of working directly with victims 
of violent crime.  Since law school, I have spoken to literally hundreds of 
native women who have survived sexual assault or domestic violence (often 
both) throughout Indian Country and in urban areas.  Most of my 
scholarship has focused on the needs and rights of those survivors.88  
The statistics regarding violence against Native women are almost a 
mantra now for many of us who work in this area.  One in three Native 
women will be sexually assaulted in her lifetime, and three out of five will 
be victims of domestic violence.89  Major news media outlets have called 
the problem "an epidemic."90   
                                                                                                                 
 88. See, e.g., Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 121 (2004); Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of 
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455 (2005); Sarah Deer, 
Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety and Sovereignty, 24 WICAZO 
SA REV. 149 (2009); Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in 
the United States, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621 (2010). 
 89. See Hilary N. Weaver, The Colonial Context of Violence: Reflections on Violence in 
the Lives of Native American Women, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1552, 1557 (2009); 
Stephanie Wahab & Lenora Olson, Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault in Native 
American Communities, 5 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 353 (2004); Policy Insights Brief: 
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It is important to understand the origin of those statistics in order to learn 
from this data, as opposed to it being a phrase we simply repeat.  Many 
advocates in tribal communities have told me that those statistics don’t 
reflect the reality they encounter.  When I talk to advocates on the 
reservations and in Alaska Native villages about the "one in three" Native 
women, they have expressed skepticism.  The skepticism is based on 
experience, that the problem is much more significant because the existing 
data grossly understates the problem.  Charon Asetoyer and other women 
from reservations have explained the severity of domestic violence this 
way:  Native women “talk to their daughters about what to do when they 
are sexually assaulted, not if they are sexually assaulted, but when."91 In 
2011, Juana Majel Dixon, First Vice President of the National Congress of 
American Indians and member of the Pauma-Yuima Band of Luiseno 
Indians explained, “Young women on the reservation live their lives in 
anticipation of being raped.  They talk about ‘how I will survive my rape’ 
as opposed to not even thinking about it. We shouldn’t have to live our 
lives that way.”92 Sexual assault has been normalized in many of our 
communities.  
In 1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics issued a report called "American 
Indians and Crime," which was really the first national exposure of Native 
victimization in the United States.93  It showed a highly disproportionate 
                                                                                                                 
Statistics on Violence Against Native Women, NCAI POL’Y RES. CTR. (Feb. 2013), 
http://files.ncai.org/broadcasts/2013/February/Policy%20Insights%20Brief_VAWA_020613
.pdf. 
 90. Suzy Khimm, The Violence Against Women Act Is on Life Support, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 25, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/25/ 
the-violence-against-women-act-is-on-life-support (citing the “epidemic of domestic 
violence among Native Americans”); Rebecca Solnit, A Rape a Minute, a Thousand Corpses 
a Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
rebecca-solnit/violence-against-women_b_2541940.html (“Speaking of epidemics, one of 
three Native American women will be raped.”). 
 91. NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR., INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S DIALOGUE: 
ROUNDTABLE REPORT ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF PLAN B AS AN OVER THE COUNTER (OTC) 
WITHIN INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE 10 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.naho.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Plan-B-Report.pdf (emphasis added).   
 92. Kirsten M. Carlson, UN Special Rapporteur Investigates Epidemic of Violence 
Against Indian Women in the United States, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:24 PM), 
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/un-special-rapporteur-investigates-epidemic-of-
violence-against-indian-women-in-the-united-states/. 
 93. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty= 
pbdetail&iid=387. For an updated version, see STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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level of victimization in the lives of Native people, including data that 
Native people have experienced rates of violence at two and one half to 
three times higher than the mainstream population.  Since 1999, those 
statistics have been affirmed, verified, and replicated by a number of 
different sources including state and tribal entities.94  Amnesty International 
investigated the high rates of sexual violence, which resulted in intense 
media attention to the problem.95  What I wanted to speak specifically about 
is the data — the one in three data and the three out of five data — and talk 
about the challenges with relying on that data.  
The first problem we have to confront is that a lot of this data is national 
in scope.  Using this data to describe problems in all tribal nations is 
problematic because each community is different.  Tribal governments have 
struggled for over a century with the "one size fits all" federal approach to 
problem solving in tribal communities.  Our tribal communities are often 
lumped into a single category (e.g., "Indian Country" or "Native people"), 
which does not account for the wide disparity in specific problems faced by 
individual sovereign nations. 
Most of the time, we don’t have specific data about individual tribal 
communities, and of course the crime rates are not the same in every single 
community.  When the national data does not reflect the reality in a 
particular community, there tends to be some skepticism about that data.  
The other problem with the national data is that it often does not distinguish 
between on-reservation crime and off-reservation crime.  
                                                                                                                 
STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002 (2004), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=386. 
 94. University of Delaware criminologist Ronet Bachman is the leading statistician on 
violence against Native women in the United States.  See Ronet Bachman et al., Estimating 
the Magnitude of Rape and Sexual Assault Against American Indian and Alaska Native 
(AIAN) Women, 43 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 199 (2010).  Other studies which support 
these findings include Shira Rutman et al., Reproductive Health and Sexual Violence Among 
Urban American Indian and Alaskan Native Young Women: Select Findings from the 
National Survey of Family Growth (2002), 16 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. S347 (2012); 
DANETTE BUSKOVICK & ELIZABETH A. PETERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: RESULTS FROM THE 2008 MINNESOTA CRIME VICTIM SURVEY (2009), available at 
https://www.unitedwaytwincities.org/_asset/fphxh5/2009_Domestic_Violence_Report.pdf; 
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2000), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. 
 95. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/ 
MazeOfInjustice.pdf. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
378 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
In order to understand how to use this information, it is important to 
understand how this data is collected and how the numbers are crunched.  I 
should preface my remarks on data by clarifying that I do not have training 
in statistics.  However, I think lawyers should have a basic understanding of 
how data is collected and published.  I apologize for the very cursory 
overview that is based on my understanding of how this process works.  
Much of this data is collected by the federal government through 
victimization surveys.96  Prior to victimization survey development, the 
only way to "count" crime was to consider the number of police reports that 
were filed.  Those of you who are victims or work with victims know that 
most of these crimes are never reported to police.97  So relying on law 
enforcement report data or prosecution data does not yield accurate results. 
The "victim survey" method was developed to contact random samples 
of the population (via telephone in most cases) and ask them a series of 
questions regarding their experience with crime.98  If a survey respondent 
indicates that she has been a victim of crime, she is asked a series of 
questions about the type of crime, the race of the perpetrator, and so on.  
Victimization surveys are the true origin of much of our knowledge because 
most victims don’t officially report crime — especially sexual assault 
crimes.  Prior to the development of victimization surveys, there was no 
way to account for crimes never reported.   
Fortunately, the sample sizes in many of these studies have become large 
enough that American Indian and Alaska Native data has become 
"statistically significant."  If the data is not a "statistically significant 
sample," then it is simply pooled with other groups of people who do not 
constitute a statistically significant sample and categorized as "other."  This 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Truman & Michael Planty, Criminal Victimization, 2011, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Oct. 2012, at 1, available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cv11.pdf; LYNN LANGTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: 
VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010 (Aug. 2012), available at http:// 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf; JANET L. LAURITSEN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, METHODS FOR COUNTING HIGH-FREQUENCY REPEAT VICTIMIZATIONS IN THE 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/mchfrv.pdf. 
 97. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 1556; Victimization Surveys, U. OF ARIZ. RAPE & 
SEXUAL ASSAULT SURVEILLANCE PROJECT, http://www.u.arizona.edu/~sexasslt/victimization. 
html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  
 98. See Survey Methodology for Criminal Victimization in the United States, BUREAU OF 
JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs_methodology.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013). 
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is commonly seen in criminology studies that classify Americans as "White, 
Black, and Other." 
But it is still important to remember that this data is based on anonymous 
surveys using random sample methodology.  In at least one series of major 
studies, the U.S. Census Bureau is a central player, and statisticians design 
these survey projects to ensure scientific validity.99  Since 1999, the data 
has been consistent in terms of the very high rate of crimes, particularly in 
tribal communities.  I am not aware of a single study (federal, state, or 
tribal) containing a statistically significant group of American 
Indians/Alaska Natives where the data doesn't suggest that Native people 
suffer the highest rates of victimization in the United States. 
However, one major problem with the data from a federal Indian law 
perspective is that the National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”)  and 
National Violence Against Women Survey (“NVAWS”) studies don't ask 
the survey respondent to identify whether a crime occurred on or off 
reservation land.100  That piece of information is crucial when trying to 
resolve jurisdictional questions and develop solutions to these high rates of 
crime.   
Another potential weakness of victimization surveys is the likelihood 
that a survey respondent may not wish to disclose a crime like sexual 
assault, especially if she lives with her abuser.  A Native woman may 
decline to disclose that she has been victimized because the survey is 
sponsored by the federal government, especially if she doesn't trust the 
results will be anonymous.  Again, these victimization surveys are a vast 
improvement over the older way of collecting crime data through reports, 
but I think it is fair to say that the numbers may not reflect the true gravity 
of the situation.  
I'd like to return to my second point — the problem with not knowing 
whether these crimes tend to occur in Indian Country.101  Again, the data 
simply doesn't tell us.  The issue of the race of the perpetrator comes up in 
this context because these victimization surveys are telling us that most 
perpetrators of violence against Native women are non-Native.  Clearly, 
Oliphant immediately becomes an issue when you start talking about 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
 100. Id.; TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 94, at 23. 
 101. Indian Country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006), and includes reservations, 
dependent Indian communities, and allotments.  Tribes only have criminal jurisdiction over 
crimes perpetrated by Indians within Indian country.  When a crime occurs off-reservation, 
even if a tribal member is a defendant, the tribe lacks criminal jurisdiction.   
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that.102  One thing is clear: Native women report in these victimization 
surveys that most of their perpetrators are non-Native.103  This is an 
anomaly in American criminology.  Most violent crime in America is intra-
racial.104  In other words, if you are a white victim, your perpetrator is more 
likely than not to be white; if you are a black victim, your perpetrator is 
more likely than not to be black.  The only exception to that general pattern 
is that Native women report their attackers and abusers to be non-Native as 
opposed to Native.  This is scientifically valid data. 
There is skepticism and cynicism in some circles about the interracial 
statistics.105  Some of that skepticism might be based on the fact that most 
violent crime in the United States is intra-racial.  Why would the experience 
of Native women be different?  And are we letting Native men "off the 
hook" by only talking about the non-Native perpetrators?  
Frankly, I think the debate is a bit of a distraction, but we have to 
confront it because it is driving much of the discussion about an Oliphant 
fix, including provisions in the VAWA 2013.  From my perspective, even if 
only one non-Native man rapes one Native woman on one reservation, that 
tribe should be able to assert criminal jurisdiction over that case.  So from 
that perspective, I don’t see the need to prove that most perpetrators on 
reservations are non-Native.  Oliphant should be fixed because it was the 
wrong decision and is inconsistent with tribal sovereignty.106  For example, 
suppose the data showed that only a minority of Native women reported 
their attacker/abuser was non-Native. Under those facts, I still think the 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes 
cannot prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country). 
 103. See GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 93, at 7. 
 104. See RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA 
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 38 (2008), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf [hereinafter WHAT IS 
KNOWN]. 
 105. See Scott Seaborne, Crime Data Misrepresented to Serve Hidden Tribal Agenda, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 14, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
opinion/crime-data-misrepresented-to-serve-hidden-tribal-agenda-118360.  But see Carole 
Goldberg & Kevin Washburn, Goldberg and Washburn: Lies, Damn Lies, and Crime 
Statistics, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 25, 2008), http://indiancountrytodaymedia 
network.com/node/93310.  
 106. Many legal scholars and practitioners have explained the flaws in the Oliphant 
decision and called for its reversal by Congress.  See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Consent 
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996); John P. 
LaVelle, Petitioner’s Brief — Reargument of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 13 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (2003); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian 
Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 303 (2003-2004). 
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Oliphant fix is justified because tribal nations should have authority over all 
crimes that happen on their lands.  However, studies showing that most 
perpetrators of violence against Native women are non-Native are certainly 
a compelling reason to fix Oliphant. 
In addition to a general skepticism about the percentages of non-Native 
perpetrators, there is the community-specific concern.  A minority of tribal 
nations is so remote or closed that non-Native people are largely absent.  
Tribal members in such communities may not see many non-Native people 
in their community. So when the data suggests most perpetrators are white, 
those tribal members may be understandably skeptical of the data's 
accuracy.  If the data doesn't reflect the reality in a particular community, 
then the data is met with skepticism by members of that community.  
And then, of course, we have the urban issue.  Some of the critique I 
have heard about the racial component of these victimization surveys is that 
they actually reflect "urban stats."  The argument here is along the lines of, 
"these aren’t numbers that are happening on reservations; they are 
happening off the reservation," so tribal jurisdiction is not relevant.  Tribal 
jurisdiction is irrelevant for off-reservation crime, so if the numbers are 
more reflective of urban settings, critics say we don’t need to adjust tribal 
criminal jurisdiction.  
So we really can't say for certain whether most Native women who 
experience crime on tribal lands are more likely the victims of Native 
people or non-Native people.  However, whether the rate is 20% non-
Native or 80% non-Native, Congress should correct Oliphant.  Future 
studies in this area should include this critical data point so we can address 
skepticism about the data.107 
Here's another interesting facet of the interracial statistic debate.  When 
someone critiques the data by suggesting that the numbers reflect the reality 
in urban settings but not reservation settings, we are still left with a really 
problematic situation.  If the data is more accurate in the urban settings, 
shouldn't we be concerned that most Native women in urban settings are 
reporting this high rate of inter-racial crime?  Again, remember that most 
                                                                                                                 
 107. The National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) is authorized “to conduct research on 
violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women in Indian Country” pursuant to 
the Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Title IX, Section 
904(a)(1)(2). Violence Against American Indian and Alaska Native Women: Program of 
Research, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/tribal-justice/vaw-
research/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  The work at NIJ is being informed by 
experts and federal stakeholders, although no date has been announced for publishing a 
report. Id.  
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crime in the United States is intra-racial.  Since we know that Native 
women are reporting this high rate of inter-racial crime, this suggests there 
is a significant problem regardless of tribal jurisdiction.   
What factors make it more likely that a Native victim in an urban setting 
is more likely than not to be attacked by a non-Native?  If Native women 
are being targeted for sexual assault, there may very well be a hate-crime 
component to some of these crimes.  There is a sense that there is a 
"rapeability" factor that comes from a product of the United States' long 
history of anti-Indian and anti-woman policies, which have become part of 
the fabric of our society.108  I think that many advocates would agree with 
me that in some predator circles, Native women are perceived as less than 
human and therefore they don't deserve protection from the legal system. 
This perception becomes enhanced for drug addicted or prostituted women, 
and predators may target Native women and girls precisely because they are 
marginalized and fall outside the protection of the law.   
As lawyers and policy makers, we need a plan of action to fully address 
the problem of sexual assault against Native women.  In my opinion, there 
are three categories of action needed.  Some of these efforts are underway, 
but much more needs to be done.   
The first category is the reform of federal law.  Control over violent 
crime on reservations should be placed back in the hands of tribal 
governments.  The Tribal Law and Order Act109 and the VAWA 2013110 are 
a good start toward returning and restoring jurisdiction where it belongs — 
with tribal governments.   
The second category of action is to strengthen the internal capacity of 
tribal courts to adjudicate crimes like rape and child sexual abuse.  There 
are tribes that have been prosecuting these crimes for a long time, but they 
are few and far between.  As more resources become available and 
jurisdiction is restored, more tribal governments will be able to take on 
these kinds of crimes.  However, one of the problems I have found in my 
research is that there are many problematic sex crime laws on some tribal 
books.  There are sexual assault ordinances at the tribal level that replicate 
state law from the 1940s or 1950s, when we had really bad rape laws across 
America.   
                                                                                                                 
 108. See ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN 
GENOCIDE (2005) (providing a full discussion of how this dynamic has developed in the 
United States). 
 109. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258. 
 110. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 
54. 
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Many of these problematic tribal rape laws were adopted in the time of 
"boilerplate" or "model tribal codes" — where a law was simply adopted by 
a tribal council without modification.111  The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
developed a “Model Code for the Administration of Justice by Courts of 
Indian Offenses” in the 1970s, which was “nothing more than a redraft of 
the old Bureau regulations.”112 These problematic tribal codes are usually 
not reflective of traditional tribal values and can make it difficult for a tribal 
prosecutor to charge and prosecute crimes against women and children. 
For example, I have reviewed tribal sexual assault laws that include 
things like spousal exemption, which prevents a tribal prosecutor from 
charging a man who rapes his wife.  That is an out-dated Anglo-American 
law, but still a part of some tribal laws.113  Another example is the problem 
of defining sexual assault as requiring physical force instead of a lack of 
consent. In some tribal codes, there remains a requirement that the tribal 
prosecutor show physical force in order to secure conviction.114  Physical 
force is uncommon in cases of sexual assault.  Perpetrators generally use 
other kinds of force, like coercion and threats.   
                                                                                                                 
 111. See, e.g., PAWNEE TRIBE OF INDIANS CODE § 234 (“It shall be unlawful to 
intentionally, wrongfully, and without consent subject another, not his/her spouse, to any 
sexual contact.”); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE § 3-4-18(4) (“[T]he 
jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with 
special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of 
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private, when 
such are not otherwise corroborated.”); SAULT STE. MARIE CODE § 71.1801(4) (“No 
prosecution may be instituted or maintained for rape, deviate sexual contact, or sexual 
assault unless the alleged offense was brought . . . within thirty (30) days after its 
occurrence.”); LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH & KOOTENAI TRIBES § 2-1-601 
(requiring “force” or incapacitation).  
 112. Russel Lawrence Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model 
Code, and the Police Idea in American Indian Policy, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26 
(1976). 
 113. See, e.g., MARICOPA AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF ARIZ. CODE § 4.20 (“A person 
who commits, or attempts to commit, an act of sexual intercourse with another not his 
spouse . . .”); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE § 3-4-18(1) (“code 
relating to sexual offenses shall not apply to conduct between married persons”); 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF UMATILLA INDIANS CODE § 85(B) (“‘Female’ means a female 
person who is not married to the actor.”)  Disclaimer:  These tribal codes are provided as 
examples and are not intended to blame or embarrass any particular tribal communities. 
 114. See, e.g., TULALIP TRIBES OF WASH. CODES & REGULATIONS § 3.6.1; FORT PECK 
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 220 (1986); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW AND 
ORDER CODE § 3-4-16; CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF UMATILLA INDIANS CODE § 85(C); 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION CODE § 3-1-10. 
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Most states have reformed rape law such that lack of consent is sufficient 
to prove sexual assault.  So tribal laws that include a physical force 
requirement are really replicating very antiquated old Anglo-American rape 
law. While we are reforming federal law we also have to reform tribal law 
so that we can put the control back into the hands of the tribal governments 
in a very practical way.  If jurisdiction is restored to tribal governments, 
tribes must be able to effectively prosecute those crimes, or very little 
changes for the lives of victims. 
The third category is to pay attention to services for our Native women 
living outside the reservation — often in urban areas.  For example, most of 
the money from the VAWA 2013 is earmarked for tribal governments and 
reservation-based advocacy programs.  I understand there is not enough 
money to go around and all advocacy programs struggle with a lack of 
resources.  The advocacy programs in tribal communities are absolutely 
critical to help secure justice for survivors.  However, that money is not 
largely available to urban community centers and Native-based advocacy 
programs off reservation. Since most Native women don’t live on 
reservations,115 we are not fully addressing the problem of violence against 
Native women if we don't secure funding and support for off-reservation 
programs.  In federal Indian law, we are obviously focusing on tribal 
jurisdiction (for good reason); but in practice, we are missing a huge 
portion of our survivors who don’t live on reservations.   
So those are my three recommendations for moving forward to address 
violence against Native women:  First, continue to reform federal law and 
advocate for restoration of tribal authority; second, ensure that tribal 
governments have the law and the training in place so that they can take 
action in cases of sexual violence; and third, make sure that urban women 
are not forgotten.  Practitioners and scholars in Indian law should be 
cautious when relying on data. We must be cognizant of how the data is 
collected and how we use it. Research is a powerful tool for federal Indian 
law reform.  Mvto (Thank you). 
M. Alexander Pearl, NALSA Alum; Assistant Professor, Florida 
International University College of Law 
It is an honor to be invited to this conference to say a few words about 
Indian law, Professor Frickey, and “grounded scholarship.”  We are here 
today to honor Professor Frickey and remember his call to make legal 
                                                                                                                 
 115. WHAT IS KNOWN, supra note 104, at 17; TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 12-13 (2012). 
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scholarship relevant for — and grounded in — tribal communities.  
Attendees and participants at this conference include tribal advocates, 
academics, law students, and practitioners of many different disciplines and 
backgrounds.  The diversity of people, professions, and perspectives on 
tribal communities contribute to Professor Frickey’s suggestion that legal 
scholarship provides Native people with a voice, while also moving federal 
Indian law and policy.  
I would like to bridge the comments made during this conference with 
the sentiment expressed by Rovianne Leigh.  As Ms. Leigh stated, we are 
here today in California where there are more than 100 federally recognized 
tribal communities.  My goal in bringing focus to California’s Indian 
Country, and the criminal justice issues these tribal communities face, is to 
highlight the distinct challenges facing these communities.116   
It is not obvious that there can be such a monumental difference between 
Indian tribes in California and those located in many other states.  I came to 
law school from Oklahoma, where I was born and raised.  As a member of 
the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, I understood Oklahoma tribal 
communities. But experiencing Northern California presented me with new 
perspectives on the significant diversity of Indian Country.  This changed a 
lot of my views about what policies are appropriate for individual Native 
communities.  The differences between Northern California, Southern 
California, and the Central Valley are not just geographic.  These regions 
all contain unique politics, cultures, and norms in both tribal and non-tribal 
communities.  For example, Oakland is a major urban Indian center 
bringing together Indians from all over the country.117  Indeed, Oakland’s 
Indian population has a history all its own.  The same goes for the histories 
of Southern California tribes and those located in rural Northern California. 
                                                                                                                 
 116. I use the term “Indian Country” to describe generally the areas where tribal 
communities are located.  It is defined in federal statute as follows: 
 (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction 
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, 
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, 
 (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and 
 (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
 117. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 93-108 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012); SUSAN LOBO, URBAN VOICES: THE BAY AREA 
AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITY (2002). 
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One thing common to all California tribal communities, however, is 
Public Law 280.118 Prior to 1953, the longstanding general rule was that 
state law, including criminal law, did not apply in Indian Country.119  For 
centuries, tribal governments were the only entities with criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country.120  In 1883, the Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka (Ex parte Crow Dog) confirmed that a crime committed 
by an Indian against another Indian did not give rise to federal 
jurisdiction.121  In response, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 
granting federal authorities the power to investigate, enforce, and prosecute 
certain crimes occurring in Indian Country.122  The federal statutes creating 
federal jurisdiction did not preclude tribal jurisdiction, but states lacked 
jurisdictional authority.123  This all changed in 1953 with the enactment of 
Public Law 280.  Affecting only five mandatory states, including 
California, Public Law 280 precluded federal jurisdiction and conferred 
jurisdictional authority on the state government to enforce and prosecute 
crimes occurring in Indian Country, thereby flipping the general rules 
regarding criminal jurisdiction. 
Most people familiar with Indian law and Native people understand why 
Public Law 280 was — and remains — wildly unpopular in tribal 
communities.  States and tribes have long clashed with one another.124  The 
Supreme Court has even recognized they are often the “deadliest 
enemies.”125  To be fair, states were not necessarily thrilled about Public 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Pub. L. No. 83-280 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006), 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2006), & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).  
 119. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 120. See generally Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Kevin K. Washburn, 
Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006). 
 121. Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka, 109 U.S. at 570-72.  
 122. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 1153, 3242 (2006)); Washburn, supra note 120, at 803-05; see also Robert N. 
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
113 (2002).  
 123. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193, 207 (2004). 
 124. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-
State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 73-87 (2007); Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative 
Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 57 (2006). 
 125. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Indian tribes] owe no 
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, 
the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
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Law 280 either, since it did not simultaneously increase funding 
commensurate with the newly obtained enforcement authority and caseload.   
After nearly sixty years, Congress finally amended Public Law 280.126  
In the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (“TLOA”), Congress allowed 
Indian tribes located in mandatory Public Law 280 states to request the 
Department of Justice to re-assert criminal jurisdiction.127  If the federal 
government accepts jurisdiction, the result would be tri-partite jurisdiction, 
shared among federal, state, and tribal governments.  This is perhaps a step 
in the right direction, as an attempt to level the playing field across Indian 
Country by providing tribal governments in California with similar 
opportunities for protecting their communities as those living in South 
Dakota and other states not subject to Public Law 280. The law potentially 
re-establishes the federal-tribal law enforcement relationship for California 
tribes, whereas tribes in non-Public Law 280 states have not been denied 
the involvement of federal law enforcement and prosecution. 
However, there is much more to Public Law 280 and its long-running 
consequences in California than the simple question of which government 
has the authority to enforce and prosecute crimes.  There are over 100 
federally recognized Indian tribes in California and only a small percentage 
have comprehensive courts and police forces.  This is a dramatic difference 
compared to tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.128  Why the great 
distinction?  It is difficult to say, and is more complex than this brief essay 
can summarize, but Public Law 280 has played a role.  State governments 
were allowed to enforce what essentially are foreign laws upon tribal 
communities with very different values, norms, and cultures.  As a result, 
independent tribal justice systems from these communities have not had the 
space to emerge and mature.  Even though Public Law 280 did not 
affirmatively preclude tribes from exercising criminal jurisdiction, the 
overlay of a foreign legal regime impacted the ability of tribal communities 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).  Congress passed amendments to Public Law 280 in 1968.  
The amendments required tribal consent in order to transfer jurisdiction from the federal 
government to the state government.  No tribe ever consented to a transfer after the passage 
of this amendment.  
 127. Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 124 Stat. 2258, 2271. 
 128. CAROLE GOLDBERG & DUANE CHAMPAGNE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280 (2008), available at  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf; STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, at 3 
(2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf (out of the eighty-eight 
California tribes that participated in the census, seventy-four relied on state courts). 
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to engage in self-determination and cultural expression through creating 
legal regimes. 
Regardless of why California Indian tribes have fewer formal criminal 
justice systems it is important to understand the need for a community to 
have comprehensive and well-functioning criminal justice systems.  There 
is great emphasis, well-deserved, on the importance of addressing the 
epidemic of violence and sexual assault against Native women.129  The 
statistics on that issue are simply astounding.130  It is not difficult to 
imagine that adequately addressing this problem in California will require a 
different solution than those implemented in non-Public Law 280 states.   
As an example, there are provisions in the TLOA, as well as the recently 
passed reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 
2013”), that provide tribal courts with jurisdictional authority to arrest, try, 
and punish non-Indian offenders.131  While this is a laudable provision with 
the appropriate policy in mind, it does little to help most of California 
Indian tribes, which lack comprehensive courts and law enforcement.  The 
expansion of jurisdictional authority for a tribal court does no good to an 
Indian tribe lacking a justice system.  Even with these national policy 
changes in the TLOA, many of the pressing issues for California Indian 
tribes will persist because the solutions are not tailored for the 
circumstances of these communities. 
Another point often absent from the congressional discussion about 
criminal issues in Indian Country concerns tribal choices to adopt formal 
western-style court systems or to use tribal customary law based systems.  
Many tribes successfully employ both.132  This is a fundamental aspect of 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS 
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2006), available at http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf. 
 130. Statistics show that one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime.  
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 94, at 22; see also Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, 
and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sarah Deer, Assistant Professor, William 
Mitchell College of Law). 
    123. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 
127 Stat. 54, 120-23.  
 132. See, e.g., The Peacemaking Program of the Navajo Nation, NAVAJO NATION, http:// 
www.navajocourts.org/indexpeacemaking.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); Peacemaking 
Court, CHICKASAW NATION JUD. DEP’T, http://www.chickasaw.net/Judicial-Department/ 
Courts/Peacemaking-Court.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); James W. Zion, The Navajo 
Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 89 (1983). 
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self-determination and directly bears on that which a criminal justice 
system is intended to do — express the morality of the community.133  At a 
basic level, tribal communities must be able to adequately protect 
themselves and their members.  The method by which this is done should 
come from within the tribe rather than from the outside.   
This is a fundamental criticism of Public Law 280.  It was an external 
law forced upon certain Indian tribes that required an outside entity to apply 
foreign law to communities with very different cultural practices.  While 
the TLOA’s potential for bringing the federal government back into the fold 
is an improvement for tribes in mandatory Public Law 280 states, such a 
policy does not recognize the unique challenges facing California Indian 
Country given their unique history with Public Law 280.  Simply re-
establishing the federal-tribal relationship for California tribes fails to 
address the need for comprehensive and culturally relevant tribal justice 
systems arising from within the community.  In sum, it fails to address the 
principle of self-determination — that Indian tribes have the ability to 
create solutions that work best for their own community. 
My hope is that the discussion on criminal jurisdictional issues starts to 
recognize the unique position of California Indian tribes.  One possible way 
to draw attention to this is by working with California tribal communities.  
That is what this conference is about and why there are people other than 
legal academics contributing to this discussion.  Learning and writing about 
tribal communities gives those “discrete and insular minorities” a voice and 
broadens the academic perspective.134   
This is part of what Professor Frickey identified as lacking in legal 
scholarship.  Talking about the law in a vacuum does not assist Native 
people, and it provides little rationale for why a change in law or policy 
would be warranted.  It would be remarkable to go and work with tribal 
communities and assist in identifying problems, characteristics, and 
solutions specific to them.  The potential benefit may well extend to Indian 
Country generally by adding to the public knowledge about how tribal 
communities operate and what needs are most pressing. 
Unfortunately, we know so little about many aspects of the criminal 
issues in Public Law 280 in Indian Country.  Professor Carol Goldberg at 
UCLA has lead the charge by collecting important empirical information 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
777, 782-83 (2006) (“Criminal law is the formal legal institution in which communities 
express important collective decisions as to what is right and what is wrong within their 
communities.”). 
 134. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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about Public Law 280 tribal communities.135  But she is one of the few 
people doing this type of work.  It would be fascinating to do a case study 
working with a California tribal community that is interested in better 
understanding the kinds of issues that it is encountering.  Proceeding in this 
manner creates an opportunity for grounded scholarship to drive policy 
choices that ultimately empower tribal communities. 
BERKELEY LAW’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEEDING FRICKEY’S CALL 
Matthew Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law & 
Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law 
The good thing about this conference is how Berkeley is taking Indian 
law and Indian Country seriously.  I remember when I wrote my paper 
about the Supreme Court’s certiorari process and its effects on tribal 
petitions, I wanted to hear what former Supreme Court clerks would say 
about my theory, and whether they thought it was very important.136  I was 
writing about what is known as a “cert pool.” Some of the justices were in 
the cert pool and some were not, but I was critiquing the cert pool.  The 
former clerks who were working for justices in the cert pool hated my 
paper, and the ones who were not in the cert pool, which included Professor 
Frickey, thought it was a pretty good paper.  But one professor, who was a 
Supreme Court clerk, said to me, just after spending a good deal of time 
being critical of my conclusions, (and I’m paraphrasing) that the paper 
reminded her of how the reality of being a student clerk is that you get a lot 
of “dogs.” She referred to “dogs” as what clerks called cases they don’t 
like, such as tax cases, bankruptcy cases, probate cases, and Indian cases.137  
The clerks don’t want to work on those.   
When they get an Indian case, an Indian cert petition, or a prisoner cert 
petition — a prisoner habeas case — they don’t pay much attention to them.  
They give them the barest amount of interest, unless the prisoner or the 
Indians have won in the lower court, and I’m quoting now, “Because that’s 
not supposed to happen.” The great thing about having Berkeley, an 
institution that frankly people like the Supreme Court will listen to, hold 
this conference is to help alleviate the disconnect — that we see on the 
Court, in the federal courts, the state courts, and maybe sometimes in the 
                                                                                                                 
 135. GOLDBERG & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 128.  
 136. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as 
Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009). 
 137. E.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 54 (2012). 
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tribal courts.  But what we have heard today is what is going in Indian 
Country, so there are my two cents. 
Katherine Florey, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis 
My name is Katherine Florey.  I am a Professor of Law at University of 
California (“UC”) Davis.  I am also a Berkeley Law graduate and a student 
of Phil Frickey’s.  I can certainly say that I would not have the Indian law 
specialty that I do now as an academic if it were not for taking Phil 
Frickey’s class, and I want to do everything I can to ensure that future 
Berkeley law students have the same opportunities. 
I absolutely agree with everything that you have said from your 
perspective as students.  I wanted to add a slightly different perspective as a 
professor at UC Davis, a program that has only recently demonstrated a 
commitment to Indian law. I know it is difficult for us at UC Davis to 
recruit Native students, and we too, like Berkeley, lose a lot of students to 
Colorado, Arizona, and Arizona State universities.  But I think the lack of 
an Indian law program at Berkeley also really hurts the profession and hurts 
the representation of Native American interests in the judicial branch and 
elsewhere.  If you look at the kind of schools that produce a lot of clerks on 
circuits like the Ninth, that are dealing with a lot of Indian law issues, it is 
extremely important that the students who get those kinds of positions be 
exposed to Indian law and Native issues.  The document that the Native 
American Law Student Association (“NALSA”) put together shows that 
Berkeley’s program falls short compared to those at University of 
Washington, UCLA, and a number of other schools.   
But I think it is also an important point that Indian law is appallingly 
under-taught in schools that produce a lot of clerks.  Looking at the 
negative judicial decisions that have occurred in the past few decades, I 
think one driving force has been that judges are not necessarily informed 
about these issues, and their clerks are not necessarily informed about these 
issues.  So it is really important, not only from the standpoint of attracting 
and retaining students at Berkeley, but also in marrying the interests of 
students who want to learn about this topic with the resources of Berkeley 
and its ability to place clerks, for students with Indian law knowledge to 
have better representation in the judiciary.  
I did a little research yesterday and looked at other law schools that are 
in the same tier as Berkeley — that is, schools historically in the top ten that 
produce a lot of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court clerks.  This academic 
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year, Berkeley is not alone in not offering a basic Indian law class.138  In 
fact, from what I could find from this academic year, only Columbia, 
University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, and Yale appear to be teaching 
regular survey Indian law classes.139 There are no Indian law classes offered 
this year at Michigan, Virginia, or Stanford universities.140 New York 
University has a one-credit class in taxation issues, so that is the only way 
Indian law makes its way into the curriculum.141 And again, this is just not 
enough in terms of what law schools need to do to educate the people who 
are going to be clerks and going to communicate Indian law issues to the 
wider judicial community.  So I think that is another important dimension 
of the problem. 
From the perspective of someone else who teaches at a UC, we have a 
very strong Native American Studies undergraduate program, and many of 
the students in that program are Native students from California. A lot of 
them feel that if they want to go to law school, they have to go out of 
state.142 I think that is very unfortunate.  It is great that other law schools are 
offering high-quality programs;143 but there are some specifically 
                                                                                                                 
 138. This information is based on my search of publicly available course listings at the 
schools mentioned.  In all cases, I searched on the terms “Native,” “Indian,” and “tribal” to 
determine what courses were being offered. 
 139. The online catalogs I searched to obtain this information are accessible at Browse, 
COLUMBIA LAW SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/browse (last visited Apr. 17, 
2013); Course Registration for Upper-Level Law Students, PENN LAW: UNIV. OF PA. LAW 
SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/registrar/2l-3l-and-llm.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); 
Search for Courses, YALE LAW SCH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/CourseGrid 
Params.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); and Course Catalog, HARVARD LAW SCH., http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 140. Online catalogs for these institutions are at Office of Student Records, MICH. LAW: 
UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/currentstudents/registration/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); Current Courses, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://lawnotes2.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/course.nsf/CbTbN (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); and 
Office of the Registrar, STANFORD LAW SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/ 
offices/office-of-the-registrar/stanford-law-class-schedule-grids (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 141. See NYU’s online course listing at Course Descriptions, NYU LAW, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/courses/index.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).   
 142. I do not have precise statistics on the percentage of Native American undergraduates 
at UC Davis at who leave California to attend law school, but the issue has frequently arisen 
in my conversations with members of the Native American Studies department as well as 
with law students who have mentioned the limited nature of UC Davis’s Indian law offerings 
as a reason why they almost chose another law school. 
 143. Only twenty-four law schools across the nation offer Indian law programs or clinics. 
Some of those include Arizona, Arizona State, Colorado, Minnesota, University of 
Oklahoma, and Washington.  See Law Schools Offering Native Law Programs, TURTLE 
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Californian issues,144 and people who have ties with California and the 
California tribes should have some opportunity to stay close to home if they 
want.  I absolutely agree that as part of the public law system and as a 
historically strong public law school with a commitment to the public 
interest, offering a strong Indian law program is really something Berkeley 
needs to do. 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIAN COUNTRY 
Joseph Bryan, Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Colorado at 
Boulder 
Even though I received my Ph.D. in Geography at UC Berkeley across 
the campus from where Phil Frickey taught at Boalt Law School, I only had 
a vague understanding of who he was. So when I was first invited to attend 
this conference, “Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country,” 
I had to first find out who Frickey was so I could hear his call and try to 
answer it.  In a short crash course of reading Frickey’s work, I gleaned a 
few things that I wanted to engage with my remarks.145  First and foremost, 
it’s clear that Phil Frickey was well aware of the eloquent and sophisticated 
legal rationale behind federal Indian law. Those qualities formed a central 
problem that he engaged with time and again, namely that Indian law, for 
all its eloquence and sophistication, risked obscuring a meaningful 
understanding of what Indian peoples’ lives are actually like.146  The more 
                                                                                                                 
TALK, http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/law-schools-offering-indian-law-progra 
ms.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).  The only law school among the five University of 
California law schools to offer such a program is UCLA.  See id. 
 144. For example, numerous California ballot propositions, such as California 
Proposition 5, the Tribal-State Gaming Compacts Initiative (1998), affect the negotiation 
process for gaming compacts between California tribes and the state. 
 145. My reading of Frickey’s work here is by no means comprehensive.  In the spirit of 
the conference at which it was presented, my intention instead was to use it as prompt for 
reflection on future directions in scholarship and advocacy regarding indigenous peoples. 
For a more thorough discussion of Frickey’s work, see Tribute Issue in Honor of Philip P. 
Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1101 (2010); see also Sarah Krakoff, The Last Indian Raid in 
Kansas: Context, Colonialism, and Philip P. Frickey's Contributions to American Indian 
Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1253 (2010).  
 146. In Frickey’s own words:  
I suggest that future Indian law scholarship should be less formalistic and 
doctrinal-less treatise-like-and more sensitive to Cohen's brand of legal realism. 
In my judgment, this kind of scholarship in federal Indian law should be 
simultaneously more grounded and more theoretical. If doctrine is at least as 
subject to evolution here as in other fields of law, scholarship should aspire to 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
394 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
developed federal Indian law became, the further it drifted from actually 
administering justice to the people who it was supposed to protect.  That 
problem was striking to me, resonating with my own work on the role of 
mapping indigenous land claims, which I will explain in a moment.  
It also leads to a second and related point evinced by Frickey’s work, 
regarding how federal Indian law does not always exist in direct 
relationship to Indians’ everyday lives. As such, the legal recognition of 
rights risks silencing actual Indian voices, further excluding Indian people 
from society through their inclusion within the legal system.147  A third 
point I gleaned from Frickey’s work regards the law and its relationship to 
colonialism. Frickey offered a compelling view when he noted that federal 
Indian law amounts to a means of governing colonialism rather than doing 
away with it altogether.148   
Taken collectively, these three points underscore Frickey’s concern with 
justice.  It was not a doctrinal vision of justice as the law applied.  Instead it 
was a more deliberative, evolving sense of justice meant to prompt a 
discussion about what we, as people joined together by a commitment to do 
                                                                                                                 
explain and prescribe Indian law where, according to Cohen, it counts-on the 
ground. What actually happens on Indian reservations concerning the creation, 
evolution, and implementation of law is a subject about which the broader legal 
community has few conceptions, and most of those are probably inaccurate. If, 
as legal realism suggests, the law that counts is the law in action, and the law in 
action should be measured by a bottom-up consequential calculus rather than 
some top-down consistency with abstract doctrine, the legal community cannot 
hope to understand, much less appreciate, federal Indian law without a much 
better sense of grounded reality. 
Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1, at 650. 
 147. As Frickey stated: 
Virtually all the writing by law professors and, so far as I can tell, mostly by 
other academics as well, that might have relevance to tribal institutions and law 
has involved abstract discussions of judicial decisions, the refinement of 
adversarial arguments about the meaning of tribal sovereignty, the trust 
relationship between the federal government and tribes, and so on. Now, there 
is nothing wrong with this, it is all well and good and contributes to a better 
understanding of ideas in the area. But the work has not grappled with the law 
on the ground in Indian country, as mediated through tribal institutions. There 
is a virtual void of information on this score in the scholarly literature. Is it any 
wonder that federal judges do not stop to second-guess their instinctive 
suspicions about such matters? 
Frickey, Address, supra note 3, at 28; see also Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1.  
 148. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 431, 434 (2005).  
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justice for indigenous peoples, might do collectively in the future.  My 
remarks are thus intended as a contribution to that debate.   
Since the 1990s, my research has focused largely on the application of 
international human rights standards for indigenous peoples, rather than the 
federal Indian law that figured prominently in Frickey’s work.  
Nonetheless, I think international human rights law faces many of the same 
problems Frickey identified in federal Indian law.  In particular, if you read 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 (“ILO 169”), or even 
the draft text of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, it’s not hard to miss how they conjure a general idea of indigenous 
peoples as a subject of international law through the enumeration of the 
rights they are said to possess.   
Much as Frickey noted with regard to United States federal Indian law, 
international human rights standards describe a particular kind of 
individual.  That individual is one whose rights are at once a function of his 
or her membership in an indigenous group and as a potential citizenship in 
a state. There is good reason for this characterization. One of the founding 
points raised by the discourse of indigenous rights has been to call attention 
to indigenous peoples’ chronic condition of statelessness. The legal framing 
of that problem proposes a remedy, namely that through legal recognition 
of rights indigenous peoples can be included within state societies, often as 
citizens.  This point is an extremely important one, a result of decades of 
advocacy work by indigenous peoples aimed at bringing a notion of 
collective rights into the present.   
And yet, in spite of that effort, it is worth pointing out that much like 
federal Indian law, international indigenous rights continues to rely on state 
recognition as a key condition for being able to exercise those collective 
rights. In that dynamic, a familiar problem comes into view, making the 
exercise of rights contingent upon their recognition and guarantee by a 
sovereign state.149  Indigenous peoples’ chronic statelessness compounds 
this problem, since it is the outcome of historical displacement and 
dispossession.150  Remedying that condition thus requires more than a 
                                                                                                                 
 149. This problem has persistently haunted human rights, a point articulately set forth in 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2d ed. 1958).  
 150. In the U.S. context, Frickey openly asked, 
 How might one figure out what powers tribes have lost by virtue of their 
dependent status? The Court has never seriously considered this a historical 
test. Indeed, how would it figure out at what point in time a particular tribe lost 
a particular power that had, by hypothesis, never been taken away by treaty or 
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doctrinal or formal legal recognition of rights.  It raises a fundamental 
question: can states protect the very people that they historically excluded 
from their society?  The point might seem overly philosophical or 
“academic;” but it is worth pointing out that it defies a simple yes or no 
answer.151  
By way of elaborating and grounding that point, let me now turn to my 
own work.  Since 2001, much of my work has focused on efforts to 
implement the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s ruling in the case of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.  Many of you are likely aware that in 2001, the 
indigenous Mayangna community of Awas Tingni won a landmark legal 
ruling from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.152  The Court is a 
part of the Inter-American System that includes the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, and its ruling holds broad significance for 
indigenous rights in the Americas.  In its ruling, the Court affirmed that   
Awas Tingni has a collective right to property established by their 
customary use and occupancy of land and resources.  The Court’s ruling 
illustrates the trend in international law for using property to recognize a 
broad range of rights claimed by indigenous peoples.153   
In the Awas Tingni case, the Inter-American Court equated the concept 
of property with the concept of territory elaborated in international 
indigenous rights law.154  Arguments made by lawyers representing Awas 
                                                                                                                 
statute, but instead by the unwritten, mystical evolution of the relationship 
between the United States and this tribe (or all tribes), as seen through the eyes 
of non-Indian judges? 
Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1, at 659.  Answering that question was thus much more 
than simply a matter of demystification through simple historicism.  Instead, Frickey implied 
that it created the basis for an entirely new approach to the importance of the law.  Id.  
 151. I take heed of Frickey’s injunction that “scholarship in federal Indian law should be 
simultaneously more grounded and more theoretical.”  Id. at 650-51. 
 152. S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A 
New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 
(2002).  
 153. S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous 
Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. 
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 237, 238-39 (2005); see also S. James Anaya & Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural 
Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 
(2001).   
 154. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/ 
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention No. 169 
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Tingni facilitated the Court’s interpretation, rendering territory as property 
and thus making it something that states could recognize.  The shift in 
emphasis was more than a matter of semantics. It minimized the perceived 
threat that indigenous territorial claims posed to state sovereignty while 
underscoring the fundamental importance of control over land and 
resources.  Maps made by the community were key to this process.  The 
maps were made in close adherence with the legal definition of territory 
found in documents like ILO 169, while at the same time demonstrating the 
feasibility of recognizing the community’s claim in terms of bounded 
notions of property.155 
In spite of the community’s legal success, it took seven years — until 
December 2008 — for the Nicaraguan government to comply with the 
Inter-American Court’s ruling and issue Awas Tingni a title. What 
happened in those seven years warrants scrutiny.  As I just mentioned, the 
legal content of the Inter-American Court’s decision made an important, 
progressive statement about the basis for recognizing indigenous peoples’ 
land and resource rights. But the Court also deferred the duty to determine 
the specific extent and location of those rights to the government of 
Nicaragua.  The move was a predictable but intriguing one, especially if 
you read the transcripts of the proceedings before the Inter-American 
Court.156  As many of you know, the community’s lawyer and current UN 
                                                                                                                 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, arts. 13-14, Jun. 27, 
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).  
 155. S. James Anaya & Theodore Macdonald, Demarcating Indigenous Territories in 
Nicaragua: The Case of Awas Tingni, 19 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 69 (1995), available at 
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nicaragua/demarcat 
ing-indigenous-territories-nicaragua-case; see also Joel Wainwright & Joe Bryan, 
Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-mapping 
in Nicaragua and Belize, 16 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 153 (2009) [hereinafter Wainwright & 
Bryan, Cartography].  
 156. In their presentations before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Nicaraguan 
officials repeatedly demonstrated their utter lack of knowledge of the area where Awas 
Tingni is located beyond their insistence that the land in question belonged to the state.  The 
following exchange between Awas Tingni witness Jaime Castillo Felipe and the 
Government of Nicaragua’s lawyer is revealing of this dynamic:  
 Government of Nicaragua (GON): Yes, Sir.  Mr. Castillo, could you tell us 
what distance you normally cover to hunt and fish? 
 Witness Jaime Castillo Felipe (through interpreter): In all the area over 
which we have the run of the land, we make use of different activities, without 
other options to work them there. 
 GON: Excuse me, what distance do you cover to hunt, to fish? 
 Witness Jaime Castillo Felipe: He does not specify the distances, but rather 
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Special Reporter on Indigenous Rights, S. James Anaya, made a series of 
brilliant arguments about state definitions of property.  In particular, he 
drew attention to how Nicaragua had used the indeterminacy and 
arbitrariness of its definition of property to justify racialized dispossession, 
not just of Awas Tingni residents, but of indigenous peoples in general by 
claiming “empty” lands for the state.  That indeterminacy also presented an 
opportunity for recognizing indigenous peoples’ own definitions of 
property as a matter of basic human rights.  During the implementation of 
the Awas Tingni ruling, state officials flipped Anaya’s argument back at the 
community, effectively accusing the community of arbitrarily delimiting its 
claim.  While state officials nominally recognized the Court’s ruling, they 
insisted on verifying Awas Tingni’s claims.  What’s more, they effectively 
tasked Awas Tingni with proving that state recognition of the community’s 
right to property would not disrupt other groups’ use and occupancy rights.   
The state’s position created a whole range of problems that figured 
prominently in the seven-year delay between the ruling and the actual 
transfer of title.  In particular, the claim boundaries mapped by Awas 
Tingni were contested — at times violently — by neighboring indigenous 
Miskito communities. These Miskito communities contested the boundaries 
that were drawn on the map, saying that the Mayangna residents of Awas 
Tingni had taken land from them and created significant ethnic tensions. 
Thus, in spite of a long history of shared inhabitation of this space, titling 
Awas Tingni’s claim required splitting the area into bounded claims,  
stoking fears of an ethnic conflict between groups that might otherwise be 
considered equally indigenous.  At the same time, the conflict over 
boundaries also obscured the very different historical and cultural bases for 
the communities’ respective claims.   
Without going into a long and drawn out explanation of how those 
arguments worked, suffice it to say that the Miskito have historically been 
much more politically powerful in eastern Nicaragua than the Mayangna.  
That inequality was reinforced by the Miskito-dominated regional 
government’s efforts to adjudicate the overlap between the communities’ 
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claims. That process cut Awas Tingni’s claim roughly in half before the 
state even began to survey the area for title.  It also created a great deal of 
uncertainty at the community level over who was getting what rights to 
what land.  In response, many young men took to preemptively logging in 
the overlapping areas, often aided and abetted by unscrupulous logging 
agents and regional politicians with a hand in the region’s quasi-legal 
logging trade.  As a result, when Awas Tingni finally received their title in 
2008, half of their land claim had already been taken away or ceded to other 
communities, the forest had been depleted, and they faced serious tensions 
with many of their Miskito neighbors.   
Those problems, however, were only rarely linked to the Inter-American 
Court’s ruling.  Instead they were repeatedly blamed on the general levels 
of political dysfunction and corruption found in Nicaragua.  The 
characterization of these problems as domestic or regional ones allowed the 
international status of the Awas Tingni ruling to stand.  They also 
reproduced a familiar division between the universal rationale of 
international human rights and the messy reality of domestic politics.  That  
distinction was reinforced by Anaya’s celebratory account of the 2008 
titling ceremony in Awas Tingni that was published in the Indian Country 
Today, heralding the event as a milestone in international indigenous 
rights.157   
Anaya’s claim about the international significance of Awas Tingni’s 
victory was not inaccurate.  It did, however, fail to grapple with the 
complexity of events on the ground. In January 2009, one month after the 
titling ceremony, I went to Awas Tingni to hear for myself what community 
residents thought of the affair.  I had no way of anticipating the political 
obstacles I was about to encounter.  To get to the community I had to 
navigate a series of road blockades mounted by neighboring Miskito 
communities barring access to Awas Tingni.  The Miskito language radio 
stations in the region crackled with threats to kidnap the leaders of Awas 
Tingni, holding them ransom in exchange for the community’s title.  
Neighboring communities further threatened to rip up and destroy Awas 
Tingni’s title, insisting that the Nicaraguan government to title their lands 
first before addressing Awas Tingni’s claim.  
Fortunately for me, I was able to wait several days until the blockades 
were temporarily lifted in order to allow political parties to campaign in the 
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communities in advance of the upcoming regional elections.  When I 
arrived in Awas Tingni, people were genuinely shocked to see me.  Once 
they finished asking me how I got there, they began to tell me about the 
events that transpired in the month following the award of their title.  In 
particular, they spoke of how they felt like they had won their case and 
obtained a title only to feel “jailed” (encarcelado) in the community by the 
ensuing blockades and threats.   
So what went wrong?  I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about that 
question since 2009, and I am still working out my analysis on that.  But 
there are a few things we can rule out.  The problems of the Awas Tingni 
case were hardly caused by bad lawyers.  To the contrary, Awas Tingni had 
one of the best lawyers in the business working for them.  Nor could the 
problems be attributed to an error in the Inter-American Court’s ruling — 
though I would raise the question of whether or not we really want to 
equate territory with property.158  Was it because of a bad map?  Yes and 
no.  The map was made according to the best abilities of the people 
working on it at the time, but the ensuing boundary conflicts should be used 
to rethink how we go about making and using these kinds of maps in future 
land claims. 
The problems associated with implementation of the Awas Tingni case 
raise a number of deeper questions that resonate with those raised in 
Frickey’s work.  Most prominently, the problems of implementation affirm 
the persistence of institutionalized racism in spite of legal recognition of 
rights.  That challenge is one faced daily by residents of Awas Tingni in 
spite of their international legal success.  This point was brought home to 
me on that visit in 2009 when one of my long-time friends in the 
community said, “We have a title now, but we no longer have a territory.”  
Put differently, the community had legal recognition of its rights but lacked 
the political space in which to exercise them.   
Now it is easy to sit here in the United States and say that the problems 
residents of Awas Tingni face are not questions of international law but 
rather of disrespect for the rule of law.  In short, they are “domestic” 
problems chronically found in postcolonial settings where states simply fail 
to apply the law.  Both Miskito opposition to Awas Tingni’s title and the 
Nicaraguan government’s delay in implementation demonstrate just how 
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much ongoing forms of colonialism shape legal recognition of indigenous 
rights.   
Nor are the problems of implementation a matter of “external” 
international law freed from colonialism contrasting with ongoing forms of 
“internal” colonialism practiced in countries.  As Frickey’s point about the 
role of the law in governing colonialism makes clear, the connections are 
much more complex.  Here, Frickey’s work suggests the importance of de-
emphasizing a “formalistic” or “doctrinal” reading of the law in order to 
take stock of how indigenous peoples envision their rights and the exercise 
of those rights.159 That does not mean abandoning or turning away from the 
law, much less the concept of rights.  Instead, it underscores that while 
there is a law to denounce injustice and inequality, in the law itself there is 
no justice.160  That point has been raised by many people, and it is 
important to heed their call.  But the real purpose of that statement is to turn 
our attention elsewhere, toward a consideration of the social basis for rights 
themselves.  
Thinking about how rights are exercised and enjoyed requires setting 
aside the law for a moment in order to recognize that indigenous peoples 
and Indians alike cannot ultimately rely on states for protection and 
guarantee of their rights.  They have to rely on other people.  To enjoy 
rights in any meaningful sense requires having others who recognize them 
and guarantee them in exchange for the same.  In short, we are dependent 
on others to enjoy our rights.161  This point is deceptively simple and yet 
essential to recognize.  It deemphasizes the central importance of state 
sovereignty as necessary to guaranteeing rights.  Instead, it shifts attention 
to creating the kinds of social relationships that will allow for the practice 
of more meaningful forms of self-determination.162  Awas Tingni’s 
experience underscores the importance of that task.   
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But my sense of the importance of that task is scarcely limited to my 
experiences with Awas Tingni.  Instead it resonates across the string of 
experiences I’ve had working on indigenous rights with regard to oil 
development in Ecuador, conservation and land loss in Alaska, land claims 
brought by the Mapuche in Chile, the politics of federal recognition of 
tribes in California, and, most recently, from my time with Zapotec 
communities in Oaxaca, who refuse the idea of private property altogether.  
As I hear it, heeding Frickey’s call means using those claims and struggles 
to think through the prospects for justice, listening to indigenous peoples’ 
own assessments of that process.  This is certainly what I have tried to do in 
Awas Tingni, but the task is broader than that.  It involves a broader 
conversation among indigenous peoples.  Briefly put, I would wager that a 
part of that task requires moving away from the emphasis on the legal 
recognition of specific rights and toward using the law to create and 
maintain the spaces and relationships necessary for the enjoyment of rights 
that I have proposed here.  In that task lies the hope for creating 
possibilities for self-determination in terms that work for people, 
indigenous and otherwise. 
Amy Bowers Cordalis, Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund 
It is great to be back at Boalt Hall. Thank you for the invitation to speak 
at this conference. I am an attorney at the Native American Rights Fund 
(“NARF”) and a member of the Yurok Tribe of Northern California. I 
appreciate the comments made today regarding California Indians. It makes 
me feel good and warms my heart to know that people are thinking of us.  
Today I am going to talk about implementation of the United Nations 
(“UN”) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (“Declaration”) in 
the United States.163 NARF has represented the National Congress of 
American Indians in the negotiation of the Declaration since 1999. The 
Declaration was adopted by the UN in September of 2007 and was 
endorsed by the United States in December of 2010.164 The Declaration 
confirms “the collective rights of Indigenous Peoples as human rights” and 
rights to self-determination, religion, education, land and resources, and 
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culture.165 NARF believes the Declaration has great potential to increase 
tribal sovereignty in the United States.  
Currently, Indian Country is just beginning to implement the 
Declaration. There were not many tribal leaders involved in the negotiation 
of the Declaration in the UN — mostly indigenous communities and 
peoples from other countries participated. Tribes in the United States 
started to take interest in the Declaration after the United States endorsed it 
in 2010.166 Now, tribal leaders are reviewing the Declaration and 
considering how it might support their communities. At the national level, 
various Native American rights organizations are reviewing the Declaration 
and hosting meetings to implement the Declaration in the United States.  
In my remarks today, I challenge Indian Country to create a strategic 
national implementation plan for the Declaration that would consist of three 
points. The first would be to familiarize ourselves with the Declaration and 
review federal Indian law for areas that fall short of the rights in the 
Declaration. Second would be to hold the United States government 
accountable to implement the Declaration and interact with tribal 
governments in a manner consistent with the Declaration. The third and 
final point would be to encourage tribal governments and leaders to use the 
Declaration in day-to-day advocacy. The Declaration is a new helpful tool 
for Native American advocates to rely upon in litigation, negotiation, and 
legislation. With strategic planning, we can ensure the most beneficial use 
of the Declaration in the United States. 
The obligation of developing a national strategic implementation plan for 
the Declaration rests with us, the lawyers, tribal leaders, and academics 
working in Indian Country. We have a professional obligation to familiarize 
ourselves with the rights in the Declaration. Based on our understanding, 
we can begin to bolster our clients’ positions.   
Critical to our inquiry into the Declaration and its implementation is 
examining federal Indian law for inconsistencies with the rights recognized 
in the Declaration. There are several areas of federal Indian law that fall 
short of the rights in the Declaration. At NARF, we have already identified 
areas of the law inconsistent with the Declaration. For example, Article 28 
of the Declaration states that the taking of aboriginal land is compensable in 
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the form of new property or compensation.167 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States168 is in direct conflict with this Article, holding that the taking 
of aboriginal land is not compensable.  
Further, Articles 1 and 3 of the Declaration recognize the right of 
indigenous peoples to “self-determination.”169 There is debate about the 
scope of this right, but at minimum, it is the right to form a government and 
make laws for your own people. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez170 suggests 
that Congress has “plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the 
powers of local self-government” and the right of self-determination, which 
is entirely inconsistent with Articles 1 and 3 of the Declaration.171 These are 
just two examples. A thorough review would reveal many more 
inconsistencies. 
The second part of a national strategic plan to implement the Declaration 
is holding the United States government accountable for meeting the 
standards in the Declaration. The Obama Administration signed the 
Declaration with several conditions.172 The most meaningful of the 
conditions is the Administration’s claim that the Declaration is an 
aspirational document, which is “not legally binding or a statement of . . .  
international law.”173 The Declaration is a statement of morals and political 
goals about how the United States should interact with indigenous 
people.174 Indian Country had hoped the United States would categorically 
support the Declaration and was disappointed by the conditional 
endorsement. Nonetheless, President Obama stated in a speech announcing 
the United States support of the Declaration, “The aspirations [the 
declaration] affirms . . . are one[s] we must always seek to fulfill . . . But 
what I want to be clear: What matters far more than words — what matters 
far more than any resolution or declaration — are actions to match those 
words.”175 As a community, we need to hold their feet to the fire to ensure 
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their interactions with tribal governments meet the standards in the 
Declaration.  
One immediate concern regards tribal consultation. The Obama 
Administration has adopted tribal consultation policies for federal 
agencies.176 Generally, the consultation policies require the United States to 
“consult” Native American tribes anytime tribal rights or interests could be 
affected by a government action.177 Tribal leader consent is not required to 
take action that could affect a tribal interest. Article 19 of the Declaration 
requires nation states to work with indigenous peoples “to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent” before taking any action that may affect the 
rights of indigenous people.178 The United States consultation policies 
require consultation on actions that could affect tribal interests, but do not 
require the seeking of consent and thus establish a lower standard of 
government-to-government relations than in the Declaration. Because 
consultation informs the United States’ interaction with Native American 
tribes, this is another significant inconsistency between the Declaration and 
federal policy.  
The inconsistency between the Obama Administration’s consultation 
policies and Article 19’s right to free, prior, and informed consent presents 
an opportunity to hold the United States accountable for meeting the 
standards in the Declaration by improving consultation policies in a manner 
consistent with the Declaration.179  
The third and final part of a national strategic implementation plan would 
be using the Declaration in Native American communities. When we, as a 
community of lawyers, professors, and tribal advisors understand the rights 
in the Declaration, although we may not agree on their scope, we can begin 
to use it in day-to-day advocacy. 
NARF is currently working on this. For example, we have relied on the 
Declaration to support damages claims against the United States. We have 
referenced it in testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in 
support of the right of free, prior, and informed consent.180 We have 
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authored letters to the Obama Administration relying on the Declaration to 
support tribal rights to intellectual property. We hope the Declaration will 
be used in the re-negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty between Canada 
and the United States. Article 36 of the Declaration confirms the right of 
indigenous peoples to work together across international borders.181 This 
enables the Salish people in the United States and Canada to meaningfully 
participate in the renegotiation of this Treaty. Such participation could 
result in increased protection of Salish interests.  
It is up to Indian Country to implement the rights in the Declaration. We 
give life to the Declaration by making the rights it recognizes our mantra in 
day-to-day advocacy. I have learned from Yurok tribal leaders that 
believing in having rights greater than those recognized today pays off. For 
most of the twentieth century, the State of California did not recognize the 
Yurok Tribe’s federally reserved fishing rights. This was devastating to our 
people, who relied upon salmon from time immemorial for their livelihood 
and subsistence.  
In the 1970s, the opportunity arose to negotiate Yurok fishing rights with 
the State of California and the United States. Yurok elders and tribal leaders 
battled with state game wardens and officials about whether Yurok people 
had fishing rights. The Yurok leaders never faltered in their position over 
years of negotiations: they had federally reserved fishing rights, despite 
losing most of their tribal land to allotment. The statement that we have 
federally reserved fishing rights became a mantra, repeated in each 
negotiation. Finally, the State of California heard us. Finally, the federal 
government supported those rights. After years of repeating the same 
mantra, the Yurok leaders secured our fishing rights. Those rights became a 
reality.  
This story teaches us to stay true to our position. We must believe in 
having rights greater than those recognized today. The Declaration presents 
an opportunity for us to believe that tribes in the United States can have 
better rights than those currently recognized in federal law. It is up to us to 
believe and advocate for those rights to make them a reality. By considering 
these three steps, we can begin to outline our country’s strategic 
implementation plan for the Declaration.  
In closing, I want to share a story. When I was a student at Boalt Hall in 
2007, I had a conversation with a fellow 3L student who realized I was 
Native American. She asked me, and I quote, “Does your family live on a 
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tribe?” She didn’t misspeak; she used the word tribe as a geographic 
location.  
That question really got to me. This student was a 3L who had risen 
through the education system in the United States and was about to 
graduate from a very prestigious law school. She didn’t even know how to 
use the word tribe in a proper way. This demonstrates that there is an 
atrocious lack of knowledge in the United States about Native American 
people and tribal governments. This country’s educators, Native American 
people, and advocates have a moral obligation to teach the next generation 
of leaders that indigenous peoples are here to stay, and that we have a 
unique set of inherent rights recognized in the Declaration and federal law. 
The Declaration is a strong statement that 150 nations across the world 
acknowledge indigenous peoples.182 These Nations confirm indigenous 
peoples’ human rights and the right to self-determination; rights to our land, 
water, culture, religion, and education. One hundred fifty nations agreed on 
these rights.  
We as indigenous people and advocates have a moral obligation to teach 
the next generation about these rights. Professor Frickey’s work was partly 
about this; teaching Indian law to a broader community, a community of 
privilege, and a community that is very powerful. I hope Boalt Hall will 
continue his legacy. I hope the collective community of Native American 
peoples and advocates will join NARF in developing a national 
implementation plan for the Declaration that results in its most beneficial 
use to improve the rights of Native American peoples and governments. 
Thank you. 
RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE 
Matthew Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law & 
Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law 
Good to see you again. I was here yesterday too. My name is Matthew 
Fletcher, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and this 
goes back to what was started yesterday, some of the things Phil Frickey 
said when he was talking about new realism.  I think this panel is designed 
to highlight some of those things, particularly things like practical 
scholarship, tribal duties, tribal law, intellectual honesty, and scholarly 
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objectivity.183 We have something like that on this panel. I think these 
scholars strive for that.  
Let me just briefly introduce the order of speakers, and then I’ll say just a 
few words before Bethany gets up. But our first speaker is Bethany Berger. 
She is really the best and most impressive legal history scholar we’ve had 
in the field184 since Rob Williams.185 Following her is B.J. Jones. B.J. is a 
tribal judge, and as someone mentioned earlier, I like to refer to B.J. as a 
man who wrote the book on the Indian Child Welfare Act.186 It really does 
not get any more grounded than that. He had the great quote, which I think 
could be attributed to a lot of people, but I remember him saying it the best 
and the loudest because of his voice, which is “Do tribal people really need 
a federal solution to everything?” The next speaker will be Heather Kendall 
Miller, who has done amazing work on tribal sovereignty in Alaska and 
especially since the John v. Baker decision,187 which is probably one of the 
more remarkable Indian law decisions in the modern era, if not ever.  And 
then we will conclude with Kristen Carpenter, who will be talking about her 
powerful paper on limiting principles to American Indian religious 
freedom.  
We should talk more about scholarly objectivism and limiting principles, 
which are some of those most powerful words that we in the community 
often do not want to hear. But, as Phil Frickey often said, we don’t really 
see the other side of that law. Phil said it in a way that was kind of scary 
and leads us into traps. It’s amazing to me, and I’m glad it was Kristen who 
really took the time to write her article about limiting principles that she’s 
finishing up right now about sacred sites, litigation, and religious claims.188  
It is so impressive, but it is sad that it took more than twenty years for this 
article to come out after the Supreme Court asked us in 1986,189 1988,190 
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and 1990:191 “Where are your limiting principles? We have been waiting for 
a long time for these limiting principles.” Well Kristen has the answer.  
Just for one more minute before we get going, this panel topic is about 
race and culture Indian law, and once again there is a paper of mine over 
here.192. My new goal is to get all of these re-prints and give them out at 
conferences. Take one with you and enjoy it or recycle it. But the panel, in 
some ways, is inspired by a couple of cases that really highlight this kind of 
trap that Phil Frickey was talking about.  
In 1974, the Court decided Morton v. Mancari,193 which we all know is 
this big case where the way we interpreted it (I say this facetiously), but the 
way we interpret it is if there is a law that benefits Indians, the law is valid. 
Courts apply the political status classification. We don’t have to apply the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; we don’t have to apply strict scrutiny. 
But if the law does not benefit Indians, well then that is racism. It is sort of 
a “you win or the other side loses;” those are the only two options.  
We get into this trap and then, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.194 Both of these cases highlight something that 
has become a big trap for Indian Country, and it derives from this notion of 
tribal membership.  The Mancari case says it is okay to do things for the 
benefit or disadvantage of Indians, so long as it is based on politics. Tribal 
membership is the core of that. The problem is, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, where tribes can articulate forms of tribal membership, is that 
they do so in a way that is downright “illiberal”, to quote Angela Riley,195 
who really should be here as well. We have to recognize that there are 
illiberalisms in Indian law and Indian Country, and what we need to do to 
deal with that.  
This illiberalism that Angela wrote about and continues to write about 
has led us, in some ways, into a trap. Tribes do not have jurisdiction over 
most non-members in their community; they do not have much jurisdiction 
over anything unless it is on land that the tribe owns or is owned by a tribal 
member. That’s not good enough. So what we have is an expression of 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA) § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006), as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. 
Ct. 1651 (2011). 
 192. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 
WYO. L. REV. 295 (2011). 
 193. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 194. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 195. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799 
(2007). 
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realism that Phil Frickey would have very much appreciated and this panel 
is a great way to finish this conference. 
Bethany Berger, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law 
So now, I’ve got the easy task of giving an overview of the role of race, 
culture, and membership in Indian status in twelve to fifteen minutes!  I am 
going to try and use technology, which may not work so well, and if it 
doesn’t work I’ll give it up.   
I’m going to do four things: first, talk about common misunderstandings 
about the role of race in Indian status; second, talk about the varied role that 
race and descent actually do play in Indian status; third, consider and 
quickly dismiss challenges that federal Indian law and the special status of 
American Indians is racist because of the relationship between race and 
Indian status; and fourth, consider and — not quite so quickly, but 
ultimately — dismiss challenges to membership or citizenship criteria that 
depend on descent as racist.   
Here is the first of the technology efforts.  This is a little movie and, I 
warn you, this is propaganda created by the Cherokee Nation as part of their 
dispute regarding the exclusion of people descended from those listed on 
the Freedmen Rolls rather than the so-called Cherokee by Blood rolls.196  
Nevertheless, it reveals a reality of Indian Country that challenges easy 
equations between race and Indian status. In short, even after the 
controversial amendments to the criteria for Cherokee citizenship, one only 
needs to trace a lineal descendant to the rolls created between 1898 and 
1914. Cherokee citizens can look black, white, Latino, or any combination 
of races, as well as looking like what people think an Indian looks like.  
Publications like the Washington Post said that the Cherokee Nation was 
excluding its black people.197  If you know anything about the way the 
citizenship criteria work, that wasn’t what happened, and the video 
illustrates this.  Equating tribal descent requirements with racial 
requirements is not that easy to do. 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Cherokee Ancestors, MEET CHEROKEE NATION CITIZENS, http://www.meetthechero 
kee.org/TakeAction/WatchOurVideo/tabid/1715/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).  
For a good discussion of the various rolls, and why Cherokee by Blood is a misnomer, see 
Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09, 2006 WL 5940403, at *6-8 (Cherokee 
Jud. App. Trib. Mar. 7, 2006). 
 197. Ellen Knickmeyer, Cherokee Nation to Vote on Expelling Slaves’ Descendants, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
03/02/AR2007030201647.html. 
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I will tell two more stories that reveal common misunderstandings about 
the relationship between descent, race, and Indian status. First is the story 
of Wanda Sykes, whose roots were traced back to free blacks in 1683 on 
the show Finding Your Roots with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.198  In later 
interviews about the show, Sykes quipped, “I’m so disappointed that he 
didn’t get me any casino money out of this!  Come on Skip, tell me I’m a 
relative of Pocahontas. I would have retired.”199  Everybody here can 
probably see some of the things that are wrong with this statement.   
First Pocahontas’ Pamunkey tribe isn’t recognized by the federal 
government, one of many requirements to engage in legal gambling on 
Indian land.  Sykes, in other words, is probably doing a whole lot better 
than the current day Pamunkey.  Second, even if the Pamunkey were 
recognized, virtually all tribes require, at a minimum, that citizens trace 
their descent to an individual on a roll created around 1900, some before 
and some after.200  So simply being descended from Pocahontas wouldn’t 
help Sykes a whole lot.   
Of course, Sykes was joking.  At the time Skip told her about her roots, 
she actually got teary eyed thinking about the difficulty of remaining free 
and black for all those generations of slavery.  But these kinds of 
misunderstandings aren’t confined to comedians.  A more disturbing 
example comes from Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson.  In his 
comments in the 1952 oral argument of Brown vs. Board of Education, he 
said, “In some respects, in taxes at least, I wish I could claim to have a little 
Indian blood.”201  First, as with Ms. Sykes, a little Indian blood wouldn’t do 
much for him.  Second, Indians pay virtually all federal taxes.202  Third, to 
be eligible for any kind of immunity from any state taxes, Justice Jackson 
would have to live near his reservation, not in Washington, D.C.203 So, even 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Finding Your Roots (PBS television broadcast May 13, 2012), available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/wnet/finding-your-roots/video/john-legend-and-wanda-sykes/.  
 199. Felicia R. Lee, Family Tree’s Startling Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at C1. 
 200. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 526-27 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing 
tribal membership laws and noting that none accord membership based on descent from a 
member as early as 1778).  
 201. BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
29 (Leon Friedman ed., 2004) (1969). 
 202. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 680 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds., 
LexisNexis 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 203. See id. at 697; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980); United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
v. South Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552, 1559-60 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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those with tremendous power over what Indian status means do not 
understand what it actually is.   
This is perhaps understandable because what Indian status actually is 
varies a lot.  I’m not going to talk about all of the different definitions of 
Indian status in detail, because we could be here all day. But even civil and 
criminal jurisdiction use different definitions of Indian.  Criminal 
jurisdiction requires Indian descent plus recognition of the individual as an 
Indian by the federal government or an Indian tribe. This recognition does 
not have to include enrollment or even eligibility for enrollment but can be 
satisfied by some combination of residence on a reservation, receipt of 
benefits reserved for Indians, participation in tribal affairs, and other 
factors.204 Civil jurisdiction, in contrast, has no descent requirement but 
requires membership in the tribe within whose territory you actually are. 205  
And, as B.J. Jones knows much better than I do, the term Indian child under 
the Indian Child Welfare Act follows a different definition, requiring either 
membership or eligibility for membership plus being a biological child of a 
member.206   
Tribal membership, in turn, just about always requires some measure of 
descent from tribal members or, occasionally, residence plus Indian 
heritage.207  Take even the South Dakota case where the court said that a 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Compare United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
woman who was one-eighth Chippewa but not enrolled in the tribe or recognized as Indian 
by the federal government should have had her affirmative defense of Indian status 
submitted to the jury to determine if she was Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction 
based on being born on a reservation, living on a reservation, participating in Indian 
religious ceremonies, being treated at Indian hospitals, and previous arrests by tribal 
authorities), with United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a 1/64 
Blackfeet and 1/32 Cree man whose mother was a member of the Blackfeet Tribe, but who 
was ineligible for enrollment and had not lived on the reservation, was not Indian even 
though he was a “descendant member” eligible for tribal health care, education scholarships, 
and hunting and fishing rights, and who had been arrested and prosecuted by tribal officials 
several times). 
 205. COHEN, supra note 202, at 697; Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61; Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe, 105 F.3d at 1559-60. 
 206. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006). 
 207. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS art. II, § 1 (1988) (requiring descent from a member plus one quarter Indian blood, 
of which one-eighth must be Michigan Chippewa or Ottawa blood); CONST. OF THE GAY 
HEAD TRIBE OF MASHPEE WAMPANOAG (AQUINNAH) art. II, § 2 (amended 1995) (requiring 
trace descent from a person listed on the 1870 census roll); CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE 
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE art. II, § 1 (amended 1992) (stating members are those of 
Indian blood on the 1934 census roll, those previously enrolled, and those born to Cheyenne 
River Sioux members who were resident on the reservation at the time of birth, plus those of 
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child of no known Native descent was an Indian child under the Indian 
Child Welfare Act because he had been adopted by members of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and enrolled with the tribe.208 The enrollment 
of the child, in fact, violated Cheyenne River Sioux written law, which says 
you must be one-quarter Cheyenne River Sioux blood to become a tribal 
citizen.209  While the case suggests that tribes in practice do not fully 
implement their restrictive enrollment criteria, it also underlines how 
prevalent descent requirements actually are. 
Moving to federal government benefits, like health care and education: 
they are all over the map.  Some require membership in a recognized Indian 
tribe; some require descent plus some looser measure of affiliation; a few 
only require descent from any tribe, federally recognized or not.210  Some 
tribes also provide governmental services or benefits not only to tribal 
members, but also “descendant members,” which are descendants of 
members with insufficient blood to enroll themselves. 211   
There is no easy definition of self-identification as Indian.  It may be 
related to enrollment or descent but doesn’t depend on either of those. 
African Americans whose ancestors served on Seminole Nation councils, 
crossed the Trail of Tears with the Seminoles, and who themselves grew up 
in Seminole country, identify as Seminole and Indian, regardless of blood 
or recognition by the Seminole Nation.212  Any number of things can make 
one the target of anti-Indian racism:  perception as Indian, regardless of its 
reality; 213  asserting tribal benefits or rights as an Indian;214 even claiming 
                                                                                                                 
Cheyenne River blood discretionarily admitted by a two-thirds vote of the tribal council); 
CONST. AND BY-LAWS FOR THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION 
OF MONTANA art. II, § 1 (amended 1978) (stating members are those on the 1935 census roll, 
those of Indian blood born to members while in residence prior to adoption of this ordinance, 
and those of one-fourth Blackfeet Indian blood born to blood Blackfeet members). 
 208. In re Dependency & Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235 (S.D. 1989). 
 209. See CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE art. 2 (amended 
1992). 
 210. See COHEN, supra note 202, at 1375; Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, 
Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1083 (2012). 
 211. See United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing descendant 
membership in Blackfeet Tribe). 
 212. See William Glaberson, Who Is a Seminole, and Who Gets to Decide?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/us/who-is-a-seminole-and-who-gets-to-
decide.html?pagewanted-all&src=pm. 
 213. Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 1994) 
(proving plaintiff was an Indian was not a necessary element of employment discrimination 
claim based on Indian status). 
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Indian status when one does not look or act sufficiently Indian in the mind 
of the racist.215  
Nevertheless, Indian status is inextricably connected to Indian descent, 
even if the connections are varied and complex.  Does that mean federal 
Indian law itself is racist?  Is it true that, as some Republicans claim, Indian 
tribes cannot have jurisdiction over non-Indians who beat, rape, and abuse 
Indian women on tribal land because tribes are “racially exclusive?”216  Of 
course not.  Jus sanguinus, or descent-based citizenship, is the dominant 
rule outside of Great Britain and the United States.217  It is also a rule of 
international law used for elections by populations in diaspora, such as the 
independence referendum in South Sudan.218  In the tribal context, basing 
citizenship significantly on descent may be the only feasible rule.   
Jus soli, or citizenship based on birthplace or long residence, would be 
vastly over and under-inclusive for tribes.  In part, because of the long 
process of colonization, many Indian people can’t live in their tribal 
communities and access educational or employment opportunities that most 
of us take for granted.219  According citizenship only to those born or 
domiciled in tribal territories would exclude more than half of those with 
significant connections to tribes.  In addition, the same process of 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-
Wis., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-90 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (condemning those who asserted 
treaty-fishing rights as “welfare warriors” and “timber niggers” at the same time as alleging 
they weren’t sufficiently Indian). 
 215. Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to 
Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
313, 330 (2006) (quoting townsperson’s complaint to a reporter that “more than half [of the 
Mashantucket Pequots] are predominantly African American and the rest are mostly 
white. . . . They just want special privileges. These are guys who used to be on welfare.”). 
 216. See David B. Muhlhausen & Christina Villegas, Violence Against Women Act: 
Reauthorization Fundamentally Flawed, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www. 
heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/the-violence-against-women-act-reauthorization-fundamen 
tally-flawed; Press Release, Senator Jon Kyl, VAWA’s Long March to Reauthorization (Apr. 30, 
2012), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/688718/ #.UUI2CzdbU3s.  
 217. See Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 
9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 73 (1997). 
 218. The Southern Sudan Referendum Act: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS 
MISSION IN SUDAN (Oct. 26, 2010), http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Referen 
dum/The%20Southern%20Sudan%20Referendum%20Act%20FAQ.pdf. 
 219. The average unemployment rate on reservations, for example, was 49% in 2005, and 
as high as 89% on some reservations.  See COHEN, supra note 202, at 1321.  While more 
tribes administer four-year colleges on their reservations, there are no research universities 
or elite schools on reservations.  Id. at 1404-05.   
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colonization means that tribes today don’t have control over who comes 
within, lives on, or is born within their borders.   
The history of allotment, or the turn-of-the-century division and sale of 
tribal lands to non-tribal members, has resulted in large non-Indian 
populations owning property and having the right to live on reservations.220   
The Supreme Court has interpreted allotment acts, as well as later cessions 
of use rights to non-Indians and states, to strip tribes of the right to exclude 
non-Indians from these lands.221   Giving citizenship to all those born or 
long domiciled on reservations would result in many tribes being 
overwhelmed by individuals with little connection and often outright 
hostility toward those tribes.  
Others have proposed a cultural test for tribal citizenship, to avoid 
reliance on descent.  As I tell my students, do you know who would be the 
American Indians of the United States under such a test?  Germans!  In part 
because of the craze for the Native American adventure novels of turn-of-
the-century German writer Karl May, a number of Germans actually study 
and re-enact the languages and ceremonies of Indian cultures that many in 
Native communities do not have a whole lot of time for.222  An 
anthropologist friend of mine recalled being in a bar in Stuttgart and 
hearing a group next to him of Germans having a fluent conversation in 
Lakota.   Despite efforts to reinvigorate tribal languages, not every patron 
of a diner in Lakota country (most Sioux reservations are dry, so there are 
no legal bars) could carry on such a conversation. 
Is the demand for descent in tribal membership criteria itself caused by 
racism?  As Matthew Fletcher has written, it certainly creates a whole lot of 
problems for tribes.223  And there clearly are racist elements in some of the 
debates about tribal membership.  Nevertheless, as you saw in the Our 
Cherokee Ancestors video, the citizenship criteria adopted by the Cherokee 
Nation do not exclude those who fit the common racial definitions of black, 
white, Latino, or anybody else, so long as they can trace one ancestor to the 
Cherokee by Blood rolls.   
                                                                                                                 
 220. See id. at 73 (discussing effect of allotment in turning reservations into 
checkerboards of white and Indian ownership).   
 221. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997); Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1981). 
 222. Rivka Galchen, Wild West Germany:  Why Do Cowboys and Indians So Captivate 
the Country?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 9, 2012, at 40, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2012/04/09/ 120409fa_fact_galchen.  
 223. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. 
REV. 295, 296 (2011). 
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Despite this, the dispute over enrollment of the descendants of those on 
the Cherokee Freedmen rolls cannot be separated from the racism of the 
Cherokee Nation’s history of holding slaves, or from its present status as a 
people in the United States, a place where anti-African-American racism is 
often just below the surface.   Equally often, as in the California cases, 
descent is used as a justification to exclude individuals for reasons that are 
largely political — ugly power plays regarding who should be in and who 
should be out of power, and who should get its benefits.224   
But in most cases, the demand for descent comes from a desire to have a 
community that has cohesion with one’s ancestors.  If things were 
different — if reservations could be economically and socially self-sustaining 
communities, with full control over who lived and died there — descent 
should not be a prerequisite for membership.  But we don’t live in that world.  
In this world, descent is an important, perhaps necessary, tool for preserving 
community and furthering self-determination.  
Thank you very much. 
B.J. Jones, Director, Tribal Judicial Institute, University of North Dakota 
School of Law 
I appreciate the fact that everyone is here to carry on the spirit of Phil 
Frickey. I actually knew Phil when he taught at the University of Minnesota 
Law School because I happen to be a tribal judge for the Prairie Island 
Indian community in Minnesota.  I want to tell you the first time I met Phil, 
Phil and I were invited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
to do a presentation at their annual conference when they were in the Twin 
Cities. The presentation was not to the district court judges or appellate 
judges; it was to the magistrates.  
Magistrates are an interesting group because in many ways they feel like 
they should be treated like U.S. district court judges, and sometimes they 
carry a chip on their shoulder for that. I recall an interesting thing — that at 
the same time we were scheduled to present to the magistrates, the federal 
district court judges and appellate justices were hearing from the U.S. 
Supreme Court justice who was assigned to the Eighth Circuit at the time, 
Clarence Thomas. I think the magistrates were most interested in listening 
to Professor Frickey’s presentation because of his reputation for reticence. 
                                                                                                                 
 224. See Carmen George, Dissension After Chukchansi Council Meeting, SIERRA STAR 
(Oakhurst, Cal.), Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.sierrastar.com/2011/12/28/57081/dissension-
after-chukchansi-council.html; James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money 
Cast Off Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/us/ 
california-indian-tribes-eject-thousands-of-members.html?pagewanted-all&_r=0.  
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We didn’t know what he would talk about, being a non-garrulous fellow. 
As a result, we had an audience that was not that enthused about being 
there. Plus, you combine his reticence with our exciting topic — the tribal 
court exhaustion rule — and we did not have the most engaged audience.225  
But Phil Frickey started talking to the magistrates and after Professor 
Frickey described “the tribal court exhaustion rule as a prudential doctrine,” 
one of the magistrates was apparently put off because he said to Professor 
Frickey, “please don’t be condescending to us and treat us like one of your 
law students,” even though “prudential” is how the U.S. Supreme Court 
described the tribal court exhaustion rule.226 Nonetheless, this magistrate 
excoriated Phil Frickey for about three minutes about how the academic 
world is so removed from the realities of what Indian people face in tribal 
communities.   
So in order to accommodate the magistrates, Frickey then proceeded to 
use two and three syllable words throughout this presentation. Whenever he 
would use a word that was in any way legalese, he would turn to the 
magistrate and say, “that means this in real life.”  I always found that 
commendable about Frickey, that he could dumb down Indian law even to 
the point that federal magistrates could understand it.  
I currently spend most of my time as a tribal judge for several tribal 
communities in South Dakota and Minnesota. The bio in the program 
materials is very outdated and must be from the University of North Dakota 
(“UND”) Law School website. I worked at the UND Law School, which is 
the university that took fifty years to get rid of the Fighting Sioux 
nickname. So it takes us a while to update things. I am mostly a tribal judge 
now. I work for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse 
Reservation in South Dakota, but I kind of traverse the Dakota/Minnesota 
border with a gavel in hand. I’m also a judge for Prairie Island, which is a 
small Dakota Sioux Tribe outside of the Twin Cities with one of the more 
profitable gaming enterprises in the nation, and for Pine Ridge, which is 
one of the poorer tribes in the nation. So I think I get a sense of some of the 
                                                                                                                 
 225. The United States Supreme Court determined that before a non-Indian party can 
challenge a tribal court’s jurisdiction over him in federal court, that party must first exhaust 
his tribal court remedies to permit the tribal court to determine its jurisdiction first. See Nat’l 
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851-53 (1985). Later the 
Court extended the same requirement to the exercise of federal court diversity jurisdiction 
over a dispute arising in Indian Country. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 
(1987). 
 226. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 20 n.14. 
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issues that go on in Indian communities on a daily basis. But I also teach, so 
I have some footing in the academic world.  
I want to talk about race, culture, and law and examine how tribal courts 
have lost jurisdiction, especially jurisdiction over non-Indians.227  How did 
Indian tribes lose jurisdiction over the years, initially over non-Indians, and 
later over non-member Indians? As part of the Violence Against Women 
Act reauthorization (“VAWA 2013”), we now have an attempt to restore 
some semblance of jurisdiction over non-Indians in the arena of domestic 
violence.228  I heard Professor Deer talk about how critical it is that Indian 
tribes regain jurisdiction,229 and I concur with her opinion. There is a lot of 
vigilant opposition to this tribal jurisdiction from groups that surprised me, 
like the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys. Groups like 
this are vigorously opposed to any notion that Indian tribes should have 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.230  
                                                                                                                 
 227. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978), the United 
States Supreme Court held that Indian tribes lack the inherent authority to prosecute non-
Indians who commit crimes within their territory because such jurisdiction was implicitly 
divested by their status as dependent nations and was not necessary to the exercise of their 
dependent status. 
 228. After Oliphant, the Supreme Court ruled that Indian tribes similarly lacked inherent 
jurisdiction to punish Indians from other tribes other than the tribe controlling the territory 
where the crime occurred in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). This decision led to a 
complete void in criminal jurisdiction over certain offenders because of the General Crimes 
Act prohibition on federal jurisdiction over Indian on Indian crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
(2012) (resulting in congressional action to overturn the Duro case by amending the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006), to make tribal court jurisdiction over non-
member Indians commensurate with federal jurisdiction over Indians). This legislative fix is 
often times referred to as the “Duro fix” and was explicitly upheld in United States v. Lara, 
541 U.S. 193 (2004). The Duro fix was considered a legitimate exercise of congressional 
authority to define tribal court inherent authority. The current attempt in the reauthorization 
of the Violence Against Women Act to expand tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indian domestic violence offenders is similar to the Duro fix in that it would permit tribal 
court criminal jurisdiction in limited instances, provided certain rights are extended to non-
Indian offenders (right to free counsel, right to have non-Indians on juries). This would thus 
appear to be consistent with Lara’s discussion on congressional authority over tribal affairs. 
 229. See Levi Rickert, Muscogee Sarah Deer Talks Tribal Provision of VAWA on 
MSNBC’s Up with Chris Hayes Show, NATIVE NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/muscogee-sarah-deer-talks-tribal-provision-of-vawa-
on-msnbcs-up-with-chris-hayes-show.html. 
 230. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Opposition Letter to Title IX of VAWA Reauthorization 
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In 1990, I was a legal services/public defender on the Standing Rock 
Reservation. I recall when the Supreme Court decided Duro v. Reina. The 
U.S. Supreme Court said not only do tribal courts lack inherent jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, they lack jurisdiction over non-member Indians.231 One 
year later, Congress reacted to Duro by restoring tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member Indians.232 When you read Duro, it is 
apparent that the Court relied on the same legal reasoning as the Court in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe by declaring tribes lacked jurisdiction 
over non-member Indians. The notion was that such jurisdiction was not 
necessary to tribal self-preservation and government and was thus 
implicitly divested.233  
When I was a public defender in 1991, a group of us were concerned 
with tribes getting jurisdiction restored over non-members because the 
Supreme Court equated non-member Indians to non-Indians. Although we 
understood the huge vacuum in public safety this decision created, we also 
understood the fundamental notion that Native people should not have 
fewer rights than non-Indian persons.234  So we reached out to different 
entities to rally some support to oppose this bill. We got absolutely nothing. 
No one was willing to step up and say this was a violation of civil rights — 
that it is not appropriate for a tribe to assert jurisdiction over Indians from 
other reservations.  
At the time, 10% of our clientele were Indians from other reservations. It 
piqued my interest: why would these entities comprised of civil libertarians 
dedicated to the rights of human beings be opposed to tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, but be completely apathetic when tribes were permitted 
to re-assert jurisdiction over non-member Indians? Could it be that non-
member Indians are not as worthy of protection vis-à-vis Indian tribes as 
non-Indians? Or perhaps there is the sense that non-member Indians, 
because they are Native, have a notion of tribal justice that non-Indians 
cannot conjure. It just struck me as odd, and as a result, I tried to go back 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696-98. 
 232. Congress amended the section of the Indian Civil Rights Act defining “Indian,” 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), to reference the use of the term in federal criminal law 
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 233. Duro, 495 U.S. at 684-88. 
 234. If the basis for the Oliphant decision was that it was fundamentally unfair for Indian 
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that tribe’s government, the same logic would seem to prevail in cases involving Indians 
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and look at U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area to determine if 
Indian tribes lost this jurisdiction because of race, culture, or law.  
Did Indian tribes lose their jurisdiction because of some legal reasoning? 
Was it due to some distinction based on race? Or was it purely cultural 
discrimination? I went back to Ex parte Crow Dog,235 a case you may find 
irrelevant to this discussion. However, it was in Crow Dog that the Supreme 
Court said the territorial court of Dakota had no jurisdiction to hang Crow 
Dog for killing Sinte Gleska on what is now the Rosebud Reservation.   
One of the things the Court looked at in making its decision was the 
notion of fundamental fairness in the application of federal law to Crow 
Dog236 because at the time there was no federal law that specifically applied 
to intra-tribal crime on Indian reservations.  The General Crimes Act at that 
time did not seem to permit prosecution of Indian-on-Indian crime because 
of the prohibition of federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal crimes.237 One of 
the things the Court looked at in Crow Dog that it later utilized in Oliphant 
was whether Crow Dog should be judged by the standards of another 
culture in a criminal prosecution — the standards of a superior people 
according to the Court. The Court said that Crow Dog was from a tribe that 
could not understand the western justice system, the legal system of a 
superior people.238   
Later on in the case of Oliphant, the Supreme Court said tribes were 
implicitly divested of jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court actually 
hearkened back to the language from Crow Dog and said that non-Indians 
should not be subjected to the standards of an inferior people in the arena of 
criminal jurisdiction.239 Oliphant cites Crow Dog for that proposition, even 
though Crow Dog had held that an inferior people — Natives, according to 
the Supreme Court — should not be subject to the laws of the superior 
American culture. This is not a race-based distinction. Instead, it is clearly a 
culturally drawn distinction — one nation’s culture is so inferior that the 
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nation should not be able to judge the superior nation’s citizens in the 
criminal justice system.240  
In Duro, the Supreme Court essentially ruled that Oliphant was 
applicable to non-member Indians because non-member Indians supposedly 
could not understand the unique Indian cultures and ways of another 
tribe.241 That leads me back to the discussion being held now regarding 
restoration of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under 
VAWA 2013. It is a very modest proposal, essentially that tribes should be 
able to assert jurisdiction over certain non-Indians that commit domestic 
violence in tribal communities.242 It gives tribes jurisdiction over non-
Indians who commit domestic violence against tribal members when they 
live in the community and have a relationship with the tribal member or 
work for the tribe. That jurisdiction applies only in certain contexts, and 
only when certain procedural protections are afforded these non-Indians.243 
In affording these procedural protections we basically countenance an 
assault upon tribal, cultural, and traditional practices in order to regain 
some jurisdiction.  
For example, tribes would have to allow non-Indians to sit on tribal 
juries. Tribes would also have to grant court-appointed legal counsel to any 
non-Indian prosecuted under this special provision of jurisdiction, and there 
would be some form of expedited federal court review in excess of what is 
currently permitted under federal habeas corpus review under the Indian 
Civil Rights Act.244  I would not want to be the tribal judge that had to 
explain to a tribal member charged with the same crime as a non-Indian, 
who perhaps committed a domestic assault on his cousin, why the non-
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Indian gets free legal counsel and the tribe doesn’t provide him with legal 
counsel.  Would you want to be in that position? I do not think so.  
I think that although I am in complete support of VAWA 2013 and its 
Native provisions, it strikes me as odd that there is so much opposition to it. 
Now I’m beginning to think, after looking at this legacy of cases starting 
with Crow Dog, that maybe we are giving up too much in VAWA 2013. 
Obviously the federal government thinks the only way tribes should assert 
jurisdiction over non-Indians is if tribes completely divest themselves of 
any traditional law and practice in its transactions with non-Indians.  I am 
not sure tribes want to do that. If you look at some of the tribes that have 
gone toward a western system, where the traditions are still quite strong, 
they have some of the highest crime rates in the country.245 Why is that? 
Because the western system of justice does not respond to the core reason 
why criminal activity occurs in the Indian communities — the breakdown 
of relationships in tribal communities due to the imposition of non-tribal 
standards and customs.  
So we have to step back and recognize that assaults on tribal justice 
systems are not race based, but are actually culturally based. At their core is 
the belief that Indian tribes cannot possibly administer justice in cases 
involving non-Indians because justice systems that incorporate culture and 
traditions have been legally decreed inferior and cannot possibly pass 
judgment on people from a superior culture. I am not sure we want to 
accept that premise as the quid pro quo for the restoration of jurisdiction. 
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